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ABSTRACT
Wherever we are, we are dogged by our past, but we have also created new realities 
and relationships that neither fit simple categories nor conform to previously 
encountered forms.
Edward Said1
Notions of 'History' seem all-pervasive and intractable when exploring 
perceptions of Palestinian and Israeli identity. The entrenchment of their beliefs 
leaves little, if any, scope for understanding or compromise, particularly when the 
two communities identify so closely with a common piece of land. Yet from within 
this circumscribed milieu, the intifadah has shaken these 'Histories' and loosened 
the strictures by which communal and individual identity are formed. It has allowed 
new identities to form around new myths and new myths to form around new 
identities. This genesis has delivered an unrivalled opportunity for the Palestinians 
in the occupied territories to create the new realities and relationships to which Said 
alludes. For the Israelis, too, the intifadah has provided challenges and 
opportunities which have fractured their whole social fabric, to the point that one 
wonders if political and social harmony could ever prevail.
This sub-thesis explores the complexities of the intifadah, but more 
importantly it examines the 'fateful' relationship that the Palestinians and Israel 
have with the United States. The U.S. government has always played a heavy hand 
in the Middle East, though its sentiments toward Jewish history, in conjunction with 
its financial leverage, impinge upon the structure and vista of any viable or lasting 
peace settlement. As such, it is important to study not only the constraints of 
'History' on any outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but also the influence of 
the United States as a critical determinant of whether it could ever be a negotiator 
for 'peace' or merely a catalyst for further generations of suffering.
1 Edward Said, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives, (New York: Pantheon Books,
1986), p. 5.
The first section of the sub-thesis provides a general overview of the 
perceptions of history and identity that the Palestinians and Israelis have of 
themselves and of each other. These perceptions have circumscribed the horizon of 
possibility for a settlement of which both parties would be amenable. The second 
section develops the notion of the intifadah as a unifying symbol of 
Palestinianization, and a force for the solidarity of a new generation of Palestinians. 
The third section looks at Israel's reaction to and management of the intifadah, 
including the divisiveness and fracturing of its domestic politics. The fourth section 
includes a discussion of U.S. affinity for Israel, its policy towards Israel and the 
Palestinians, and its attempts at assisting in a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Finally, the last section recapitulates the milieu in which 'the fateful 
triangle' finds itself enmeshed, and ends on a discouraging note, concluding that the 
intifadah will end in tragedy for both Palestinians and Israelis alike, whereas it will 
leave the United States primarily untouched. July 1990
ADDENDUM
Events can change rapidly in the Middle East, with the most recent 'crisis' 
involving Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, and the deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia 
by the United States and its 'allies.' This sub-thesis was completed before these 
events, and does not seek to incorporate any such new information. Perhaps it is 
tenable to say, however, that the Saddam Hussein's venture will merely strengthen 
the United States' relationship with Israel, while leaving the Palestinian-Israeli 
'peace' process in its always-protracted 'not-yet.' August 1990
1States can change their policies, [but not the PLO], whose whole justification for 
existing is hatred of Israel and the desire to wipe it out, whether at once, or in stages.
Yitzhak Shamir1
. . . [T]he readiness of the Palestinian people to endure tremendous sacrifices and its 
determination to persevere in its 'intifadah' have proven without any shadow of doubt 
that the rights of this people and its manifest will to achieve independence and 
establish its own state on national soil cannot be ignored.
Yasir Arafat2
The United States' special commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains 
unshakable.
Ronald Reagan
We are friends, strategic partners, and allies. And the mutual interests that bind 
together the people of the United States and Israel are broad and deep. I reassured 
the Prime Minister that the fundamental basis of our approach to a Middle East 
settlement has not changed. . . .  I reaffirmed . . . that we do not support an 
independent Palestinian state. . . .
George Bush4
I
PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS:
A CONFLICT OF HISTORIES’
The Middle East has long been a region which evokes images of anguish, 
fanaticism, paroxysm, 'irrationality,' passionate emotion, helplessness, malaise, and a 
fervent religious fundamentalism - where the gods of history seem to meet in 
gladiatorial combat for the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world. One 
witnesses the volatility of people struggling to 'survive,' to maintain their identity - 
not unlike others - but in a region particularly contingent upon its geography, 
history, culture, religiousness, leadership, and sensitivity to influence from the
1 As cited in Robert Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," World Policy Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 1989, p. 359.2 Yasir Arafat, "Significance of the Proclamation of the Palestinian State," Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 40, no. 939, 20 May 1989, p. 11.3 Ronald Reagan (President's Statement), "U.S. Opens Dialogue With PLO," 
Department of State Bulletin, vol. 89, no. 2143, February 1989, p. 51.4 George Bush, "Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 25, no. 14,10 April 1989.
2outside world. Although attempts have been made to quell the multiplicity of
conflicts (whether perceived or otherwise) which seem to arise in ceaseless fashion,
the passion with which people live their lives is real and not something which can be
dissipated easily, if at all.
Such is the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli situation; both Israelis and
Palestinians perceive themselves as being highly vulnerable, and do their utmost to
maintain their national identity - which is manifest in the continued existence of the
group.5 Themes of destruction, physical annihilation, and nonexistence play a
predominant role in their self-images. These existential concerns envelop the lives
of both peoples, such that an ageless, nagging fear of 'the Other' pervades not only
their historical memories and contemporary realities, but appears unlikely to wane
with the seemingly inherent unpredictability of the morrow.
The image of the Jew, plagued with a collective psyche which agonizes over its
two thousand years of pogrom, is well known:
I am named after my father's brother, who fell in the ranks of the Red Army at the 
gates of Warsaw. This happened in 1920. My father was named after the brother of 
his father who was murdered in the Ukraine during a pogrom by rampaging peasants.
This was in 1891. . . . Are we now still at the beginning of the road? At the middle?
At the end? I only know this: in this half-century in which I live and breathe, fear of 
death has never left our house.6
A geneology of identity, such as that recounted above, has bound generations of 
Jews together into an empathetic atemporal communion of suffering. In the late 
nineteenth century, Jews, weary of the oppression of European anti-Semitism7 and 
marred by generations of diaspora, became galvanized by Herzl's dream of a Jewish
5 Herbert Kelman, "Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," in Samuel Wells and Mark Bruzonsky (eds.), Security in the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 150.6 As cited in Seth Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 127.
7 Bill and Leiden add, however, that "anti-Semitism was less a religious movement than a racist one. Anti-Semites found their targets not merely in Jews per se, but in people they did not like or whom they feared or envied. They often identified these people as Jew s.. . ."  James Bill and Carl Leiden (eds.), Politics in the Middle East,2d ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 327.
3homeland. From this, the Zionist movement was formed and constituted around 
the idea that Palestine, the ancient land of the Jews as textualized in the Old 
Testament, was the telos of their new home. Their catch-cry, "A land without a 
people for a people without a land," epitomized the belief that most of Palestine was 
relatively empty8 - or inhabited by 'natives' "thought by most Europeans to be 
culturally if not physiologically inferior"9 - and thus cemented the foundation of an 
intractable security dilemma for future generations.
By 1914, about 85,000 Jews had wandered from the wilderness to settle in the 
promised land of Palestine - joining the 600,000 Palestinian Arabs already inhabited 
there - but deteriorating conditions, including harsh treatment of the Jews by the 
Ottomans in World War I, wartime dislocations and a failed harvest, prompted a 
decline in the population to 55,000 within a few years.10 By the late 1920s, Jewish 
immigration had dwindled to a mere trickle.11
With the emergence of fascism in Europe, there came a conscious, systematic 
annihilation of the Jewish people that transformed a late nineteenth century Zionist 
dream into a mid-twentieth century Jewish necessity. Notions of security, self- 
determination, a Jewish identity, as well as a national homeland, became 
entrenched within the exhausted, yet determined, psyche of the diaspora. Farganis 
explains:
8 Israel Zangwill, "The Return to Palestine," New Liberal Review, December 1901, 
p. 627, as cited in Ibid., p. 329.
James Bill and Robert Springborg (eds.), Politics in the Middle East, 3d ed.,(Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990), p. 316. Bill and Springborg also cite (p. 317) the following passage by a European intellectual of that period: "It is no exaggeration to say that throughout these long centuries the native inhabitants of Palestine do not appear to have made a single contribution of any kind whatsoever to material civilization. It was perhaps the most unprogressive country on the face of the earth. Its entire culture was derivative." Also see Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).10 Roy Anderson, Robert Seibert, Jon Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation, 2d ed., (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1987), p. 83.11 Bill and Leiden, Politics in the Middle East, p. 333.
4Before the holocaust one could debate with the Zionists whether theirs was the most 
reasonable solution to the treatment accorded the Jews in Europe; after Hitler there 
was no longer a place in the debate for the assimilationists. . . . The question facing 
Jews, as actors in history, was not whether to be Zionists but how best to realise the 
Zionist dream of a homeland in Palestine.12
Within the dynamically changing context of an emerging 'international
system,' however, a national homeland would not suffice for the Jews, for it lacked
both the legitimacy and security which they perceived only a state could provide. In
1947, upon the recommendation of the newly formed United Nations (U.N.)
General Assembly, Palestine was partitioned into Jewish and Arab states, with an
international zone encompassing Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The following year, on
14 May 1948, Israel declared its statehood. The Jewish people, however, found no
consolation, let alone any sense of security, in its newly created state; incessant Arab
hostility and conflicts in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 contributed to the further
entrenchment of Jewish xenophobia - which resolves that the Jew is condemned to
indomitable abuse and oppression - or what Goldmann coins "a persecution
mania."13 The personal experience of Arie Eliav, former General Secretary of
Israel's Labor Party, demonstrates the perpetuity of these symbols of destruction
and genocide, despite the creation of an apparatus (the State of Israel) which was
designed to mollify such insecurity:
A Jew born in Russia to refugees from violence in the midst of a bloody civil war; a 
man whose Zionist parents brought him to the Land of Israel as an infant and planted 
him in the golden sands of Tel Aviv; . . .  a Jew who, after fighting as a youth in the 
battlefields of the Western Desert and Europe in World War II, was among those 
who opened up the Nazi death camps and helped to save the survivors; a man who 
went on to fight in the War of Independence and the wars of Israel that followed, until 
he was sent back to the rear; a father whose son continued to fight in the Yom Kippur 
War, while he himself was called to serve in the most terrible unit he had ever known, 
whose task it was to tell the parents about the deaths of their son s.. .  .14
12 Sondra Farganis, "The chosen people: the historical formation of identity," in Gisela Kaplan and Clive Kessler (eds.), Hanna Arendt: Thinking, Judging, Freedom,
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), p. 110.As cited in Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 124.14 Arie Eliav, Shalom: Peace in Jewish Tradition, (Israel: Massadah, 1977), p. 1.
5The Israeli appropriation of this strong symbolism of 'the persecuted Jew' has 
allowed those within the current community to maintain a unilinear and unbroken 
perception of themselves, such that their reality becomes one of "'utter loneliness,' of 
a people surrounded by implacable enem ies,. . .  and of a world coldly indifferent to 
the tribulations of the Jewish people."15 Nevertheless, the creation and maintenance 
of a particular Jewish 'history' has served to legitimate and recursively entrench (for 
itself, the diaspora and the West) Israel's existence as a symbol of collective Jewish 
identity.16
Palestinians, on the other hand, have been unable to draw on any "vast 
historical tragedy of apocalyptic proportions" such as that identified with the Jews.17 
Palestinians perceive themselves as being less 'understood' by those in the West, and 
deplore the disdain and 'negativity' often associated with them. Gilmour explains: 
"To millions of people the word Palestinian conjures up the picture of 'The 
Terrorist,' that uncouth, shifty figure with a gun, prepared to kill people of any age, 
sex or colour, without apparent reason."18 Contrary to such notions, Palestinians, 
too, bear ardent existential concerns.
15 Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 123.16 Avineri explains," . . .  to be Jewish today means, in one way or another, feeling 
some link with Israel. . .  it is the State of Israel that united more Jewish people all over the world than any other factor in Jewish life." Shlomo Avineri, The Making of 
Modem Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State, (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 219.17 Said continues, "The Palestinian disaster (or nakba) is human: the destruction of a 
society, the dispossession and painfully secular, mundane exile that followed, the loss to Zionism of the right even to have a history and a political identity. Most of all the Palestinian has suffered because he or she has been unknown, an 
unacknowledged victim, and worse, a victim blamed not only for his or her disasters, but for those of others as well. Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (eds.), 
Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question, (London: Verso, 1988), p. 6.
18 David Gilmour, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians, (London: Sphere Books, 1980), p. 15. Chomsky also argues that "Palestinians and their organi­zations . . .  have been portrayed in terms of violence, terrorism, irrationality, and uncompromising refusal to come to terms with the existence of Israel or to accept the norms of decent behaviour." Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1983), p. 5.
6For Palestinians, the "land without a people . . . "  slogan proclaimed by the 
Zionists could not have been more of a misnomer, for not only was the land 
inhabited, it was (and still is) an integral element of Palestinian identity and culture. 
Land, or el ard, is expressed through literature, song, folktales, rhetoric, and political 
theory; it endows the Palestinian community with meaning and continuity. Turki 
expresses this communal affinity below:
Land. El ard. Everything . . . came to be seen as emerging from the womb of el ard: 
the origin of our mythology of hope, the vivid immediacies of daily life, metaphoric 
meditations on meaning, associative context of reference, as well as acoustic and 
tactile sensations. At every point of development, from childhood to old age, 
Palestinians lived on the land. Lived on it. Lived with it. Lived off it. From it they 
acquired their memories and their moods and their ego ideal and their core concept 
of their place in existence. The land always contained the actuality of the past and the 
potentiality of the future, and hence the intimate center of the present. Without it, 
very simply, a Palestinian could not establish his or her identity.19
From within this worldview, el ard - the land, and el umma - the community - 
are interdependent; they are woven into a single fabric, and form the basis for a 
simple Palestinian cry, "Ardi hiya hawiyati," or "My land is my identity."20 
Accordingly, Palestinians felt an estrangement from their land (i.e., their identity) as 
they witnessed an increasing Zionist presence and the creation of a Jewish State in 
Palestine.21 The eventual loss of the West Bank and Gaza only exacerbated the 
feelings of an already disenchanted, dispossessed, and dispersed community. Said 
reflects on this faceless existence:
19 Fawaz Turki, Soul in Exile: Lives of a Palestinian Revolutionary, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 65. Also see Paul Cossali and Clive Robson, Stateless in Gaza, (London: Zed Books, 1986).20 Turki, Soul in Exile, p. 66.21 "Since 1948 Israel has bulldozed 385 of the 475 Palestinian villages that were inside the 'Green Line' and wiped their names from maps, in many cases replacing 
them with Hebrew names. Officially, Palestinians in Israel are known as Israeli Arabs. Prime Minister Golda Meir declared in 1969 that there was no such thing as the Palestinian people - 'they did not exist.' In that same year Menachem Begin 
warned an Israeli audience of the consequences of allowing the term Palestine to be used. He said, 'If this is Palestine, then it belongs to a people who lived here before you came.'" Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, pp. 340-341.
7How rich our mutability, how easily we change (and are changed) from one thing to 
another, how unstable our place - and all because of the missing foundation of our 
existence, the lost ground of our origin, the broken link with our land and our past.
There are no Palestinians. Who are the Palestinians? The inhabitants of Judea and 
Samaria.' Non-Jews. Terrorists. Troublemakers. DPs. Refugees. Names on a card. 
Numbers on a list. Praised in speeches - el pueblo palestino, il popolo palestino, le 
peuple palestinien - but treated as interruptions, intermittent presences.22
Within such varied contexts, historical memories can be tenacious forces
when unleashed into the realm of the present arena. Wallerstein argues that
memories such as those imbued within the Israeli and Palestinian psyche have a
primordial quality about them that circumscribe the shape and structure of future
possibilities:
Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they 
might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is 
an essential element in the socialisation of individuals, in the maintenance of group 
solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness 
therefore is preeminently a moral phenomenon.
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians, infused with the anxiety associated 
with their 'lessons of history,' are ever more adamant that the destruction of their 
group is inherent in 'the Other's' ideology. To Israelis, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization's (PLO's) attempt to liberate Palestine is synonymous with liquidating
22Edward Said, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 26. Sahar Khalifah expresses such sentiments as well: "Tension inside, tension outside . . .  you feel you are in a whirlpool, a whirlwind, a pressure cooker . . .  Occupation, demonstrations, news, trials, prisons, demolished houses, demolished souls. Taxes . . .  a new devaluation, a new settlement there; tomorrow 
they'll build a new one here. Where shall I go then? To whom shall I protest?" As cited in Everett Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace: A Future for Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East, rev. ed., (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), p. 59.Turki, too, recalls: "I was just another eight year old growing up in the refugee camps. All around me people talked about Palestine as if it were the center where 
all the impulses of their human identity intersected. And everybody was angry. Their anger tangled in the hair of the tents and the muddy lanes of the refugee camps. The men and women were angry because they had to count their years without the harvest. The children were angry because, as they began to acquire a past, moment by moment, touch by touch, encounter by encounter, they discoveredthat a sense of otherness governed their lives___ A sense of ennui, of resignation,ruled the camp, our lives." Turki, Soul in Exile, pp. 18-19. Also see Fawaz Turki, "To Be a Palestinian," in Uri Davis, Andrew Mack and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), 
Israel and the Palestinians, (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), pp. 188-197.23 Immanuel Wallerstein, "The construction of peoplehood: racism, nationalism, ethnicity," Sociological Forum, vol. 2, pp. 373-388.
8Israel; and to Palestinians, Israel, as part of an inherently expansionist Zionist 
ideology, is prepared to eliminate Palestinian communities that hamper the 
achievement of its vision of a greater Israel.24
As such, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by exclusionary 
attitudes, whereby not only existential survival, but also the survival of one's history, 
identity, and legitimacy are intimately bound into a belief that the dispute can only 
be resolved in zero-sum terms.25 Thus, with both groups displaying a profound 
reluctance to accept and recognize 'the Other,' any suggestions to either party to 
make any effort even resembling a first step have been simply anathema to their 
physical and spiritual being.26 Amidst such vistas - where the brush strokes sweep 
broad and rich textures beyond the horizon, and where communal suffering and 
angst loom large, does the intifadah represent a new beginning, or is it, too, 
condemned to the dictates of the 'Past'?
24 Kelman, "Creating the Conditions," p. 150.25 See Meron Benvenisti, 1987 Report: Demographic, economic, legal, social and 
political developments in the West Bank, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 74-76; Herbert Kelman, "The Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Yehuda Lukács and Abdallah Battah (eds.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 337-339; Gloria Falk, "Israeli Public 
Opinion on Peace Issues," in Bernard Reich and Gershon Kieval (eds.), Israeli National Security Policy: Political Actors and Perspectives, (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1988), p. 203.26 "Because each community, Palestinian and Israeli, denied the other's legitimacy as a collective, 'perpetual conflict' would prevail. 'This delegitimization is vital for both sides, for it enables both to believe in the exclusivity of their claim and in the absolute justice of their position.'" See Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian 
Uprising, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 27-29.
9INTIFADAH:
PALESTINIANS AND PALESTINIANIZATION
In the first section, the conflict was characterized specifically as one between 
Palestinians and Israelis, and not as an "Arab-Israeli" conflict. It is perhaps 
pertinent at this point to allude more fully to this distinction. Although the early 
twentieth century dispute over Palestine essentially affected an indigenous 
'Palestinian' population, the subsequent "Arab-Israeli" conflict became one of 
various hostilities at both a regional and 'Superpower' level: first, between the new 
State of Israel and surrounding Arab countries; and second, between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Within this milieu, the salient feature of these 
variously constituted rivalries is that the indigenous Palestinians always played a 
secondary role.
With the emergence of a "Palestinian-Israeli" impasse, it becomes necessary 
to highlight the explicit Palestinianization of the conflict - a process which has 
become symbolized by a different genesis to that of the broader notion of an "Arab- 
Israeli" conflict. This genesis manifest itself in late 1987, and became known as the 
intifadah - whereby indigenous Palestinians 'revolted' against the social contract they 
were apportioned, or, more substantively, 'revolted' against the lack of one.27 
Kelman contends:
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been . . . increasingly transformed from an interstate 
conflict between Israel and its neighbouring states to an intercommunal conflict 
within the post-1967 borders of Israel. . . . The events [of the intifadah] both reflect 
and contribute to an intensification of the process of Palestinianization.28
21 Ibid., p. 33.28 Kelman, "Palestinianization," pp. 333, 340. Sahliyeh, too, stresses this point: "The uprising transformed the interstate dispute between Arabs and Israelis into an intercommunal conflict between Israelis and Palestinians." Emile Sahliyeh,In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967, (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 185.
II
10
Peretz adds, "Now the Arab states [are] the secondary participants, with Palestinians 
again in the lead."29
This process of Palestinianization has remained a central strand of the 
uprising's tenacity and durability, so it is important to establish its validity within this 
section, which therefore allows one to explore the possibilities that have arisen (and 
will arise) from this starting point. Thus it becomes crucial to probe the recursive 
interaction between the possibility of new paradigmatic 'histories' being created 
from a generic situation (the intifadah) - which could result in a 'peace' settlement - 
and the pressures of 'past' identity, as outlined in section one, which vitiate such 
possibilities.
The intifadah has demonstrated a new resolve among Palestinians, despite 
the fact that prior to this spontaneous uprising, the Palestinian 'cause' seemed to be 
waning: analysts spoke of the disappearance of the Green Line, of the apparent 
apathy of Palestinian youth, of the fragmentation of a PLO consensus in both the 
occupied territories and the diaspora, and of the increased rejection of PLO policies 
and leadership.30 PLO offices closed in Jordan and Egypt. In the United States, the 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which sought to close the PLO's information office in 
Washington, D.C. and its United Nations observer status, was in the process of 
being approved overwhelmingly in Congress.31 Finally, media reports from the 
November 1987 Arab summit in Amman presented the meeting as:
an historic turning point in the course of Middle Eastern politics . . . [and] . . . were 
told that it signified the Arab world's long-awaited disengagement from the Palestine 
issue in favour of concentration on the Gulf war; the return of Egypt to the Arab fold 
without any concessions regarding its peace with Israel; "moderate" Jordan's taking on 
a pivotal role in the Arab world; and the PLO's imminent eclipse.32
29 Peretz, Intifada, p. 192.
30 Rashid Khalidi, "The Uprising and the Palestine Question," World Policy Journal, 
vol. 5, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 497.
31 Ibid., p. 498.32 Ibid. Also see, Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 611; Peretz, Intifada, p. 34; David McDowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond, (London: I.B.
11
Contrary to popular analyses, however, the PLO and the Palestinian cause 
festered more than waned. The killing of four Palestinian workers in Gaza by an 
Israeli on 8 December 1987 became the impetus sparking an uprising which has 
continued for more than two years, claiming the lives of almost 1000 Palestinians, 
and injuring more than 80,000.33 "The intifadah took Israel by surprise, creating 
political turmoil within the country; it raised Palestinian national consciousness, 
created a new sense of solidarity, and once again focused world attention on the 
Palestinian problem."34 Nightly television images portrayed stone-laden youth, their 
faces covered by kufiyyahs, confronting heavily-armed Israeli defense-force soldiers. 
The media capitalized on this apparent reversal of David and Goliath lore, whereby 
Israel is portrayed as the Leviathan reigning down upon some 'impure stock' - often 
deemed the "Jews of the Jews."35
The essence of the intifadah has reflected unprecedented support for and 
participation in civil resistance, which has cut across socio-political boundaries of 
the Palestinian community. Most notable has been the current generation of young 
Palestinians36 - cognizant only of life under occupation - who reject Israeli control as 
profoundly as their elders, but are less dependent on the Arab world, more willing 
to take risks, and unfettered by the fear of confronting, virtually unarmed, the
Tauris and Co Ltd, 1989), p. 103; Robert Hunter, "Seeking Middle East Peace," 
Foreign Policy, no. 73, Winter 1988-1989, p. 4.33 As of 31 June 1990. PLO Information Office, Canberra, Australia, 24 July 1990.34 Don Peretz, "Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising," Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 5, 
Summer 1988, p. 971.35 Realize, too, that some strongly criticize the U.S. media for its "incessant and blatantly one-sided coverage of the intifada." Mitchell Bard, "Israel: Some Surprising Polls," Commentary, vol. 88, no. 2, August 1989, p. 47. I. A. Lewis, "American Jews and Israel," Public Opinion, vol. 11, no. 2, July/August 1988, p. 54.
36 Forty-eight percent of Gazans and 46% of West Bankers were under 14 in 1987;A December 1988 study concluded that 76.9% of Gaza was under the age of 29. See Rashid Khalidi, "The Uprising and the Palestine Question," p. 497-498, and Aaron 
Miller, "Palestinians and the Intifada: One Year Later," Current History, vol. 88,
no. 535, February 1989, p. 74.
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weight of the Israeli army.37 Twenty-five percent of those killed have been 16 years 
of age or under.38 The uprising's spontaneity and pervasiveness have become 
symbolized by these 'children of the stones.'39 Kuttab, who profiled these stone- 
throwing youth, observes: "To throw a stone is to be 'one of the guys'; to hit an 
Israeli car is to become a hero; and to be arrested and not confess to having done 
anything is to be a man."40 Kuttab also notes that despite the seeming spontaneity of 
such activities, a consistent pattern of organizing demonstrations could be discerned. 
The seven to ten year olds roll tires into roads, pour gasoline on them, and set them 
afire; the eleven to fourteen year olds block traffic by placing large rocks in the 
road; and the fifteen to nineteen year olds, the 'veteran stone throwers,' inflict 
damage on passing cars with their homemade slingshots.41
Many of these youths - some 50,000 to 60,000 since 1967, according to some 
estimates42 - have already seen the inside of Israeli jails; but instead of tempering 
the anger and frustration these Palestinians feel, the jails have become their 
universities43 and serve as sites for the 'indoctrination of Palestinian youth.' Highly
37 Ann Lesch, "Uprising for Palestine: Editorial Commentary," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 11, no. 4, Summer 1988, p. 4-5. Lesch also 
provides the following example (p. 5): "To cite one case, on February 8 [1988] Khader Tarazi, the 19 year-old son of a prominent Catholic family in Gaza, came 
across a demonstration in the city. He was chased into a house by soldiers, who beat him with clubs and gun butts until blood poured from his mouth and nose. Then his limp body was tied to the hood of a military jeep and he was beaten further. The soldiers drove off, still carrying the body on the hood. During Khader's funeral the next day, soldiers surrounded the church and tear-gassed the 600 mourners. Nevertheless, the funeral procession down the main street bore an air of defiance, the casket draped with the Palestinian flag and mourners carrying flags and photos 
of the youth."38 Kate Rouhana, "The Other Intifada: The Crucial Economic War Heats Up,"The Nation, vol. 250, no. 1, 1 January 1990, p. 1.39 Peretz, Intifada, p. 83.40 Daoud Kuttab, "A Profile of the Stonethrowers," Journal of Palestine Studies,
vol. 17, no. 3, Spring 1988, p. 14. Also see Jonathan Kuttab, "The Children's Revolt," 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, Summer 1988, pp. 26-35.41 Peretz, Intifada, p. 84.42 Peretz, "Intifadeh," p. 966.43 John Kifner, "Settlers in West Bank Kill a Palestinian," New York Times,
12 January 1988, p. 8.
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organized networks of leadership, education, and communication have weaved their 
way through prison cracks and crevices, and directed the population from within. 
Secretly-elected committees mediate disputes between political factions, stage 
hunger strikes, and transmit appeals.44 An extensive educational system includes 
classes in national politics and history, debates on current affairs, literacy programs, 
and instruction in specialised areas.45 Benvenisti observes, '"Graduates' of Israeli 
prisons are accorded honoured status by their peers and gain easier terms for West 
Bank university admission and for university examinations."46 Furthermore, 
communication between detainees is unparalleled. Radwan Abu Ayash recalls:
The communications were superb. If you wanted something to be known, you hid a 
note in a cigarette box - God, the cigarettes were awful - and passed it from cell to 
cell, then from ward to ward, and then it was transported by labourers from yard to 
yard. Within five minutes the whole prison can know anything you want. I wrote a 
long song about the guards watching us and our living in the sun. In a few days 
everybody in the prison knew the words, and they would sing it all the time.47
These 'cadre schools' have maintained an impressive reputation; so much so that
some 'activists' claimed to have deliberately violated Israeli law so as to gain entry
into the system.48 Abu Ayash continues, "We had a very well-organized society, and
if you compared it with the outside, you found you were in a real school of thought.
It was a school of uprising, a school of spirit, a school of hope."49 Similarly, a young
Palestinian noted, "If someone goes in blind, he comes out with a hundred eyes."50
44 Yezid Sayigh, "The intifadah continues: legacy, dynamics and challenges," Third World Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3, July 1989, p. 23.45 Ibid. A former detainee explains, "We read a lot and had lessons; people who wanted to learn English or Hebrew or physics would find one of the prisoners to 
teach them. And we would have political discussions at night." John and Janet Wallach, Still Small Voices, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p. 5.
46 Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1986), pp. 58-60, 176.47 Wallach, Still Small Voices, p. 5.48 Sayigh, "The intifadah continues," p. 23.49 Wallach, Still Small Voices, p. 5.50 Kifner, "Settlers in West Bank Kill," p. 3.
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Women, too, have played a prominent role in the intifadah. With a vacuum 
created by the incarceration of thousands of men, women have emerged from their 
'behind-the-scenes' roles to tackle responsibilities traditionally associated with their 
male counterparts. Not only have they been active leaders in the neighbourhood 
committees, and political and communal organizations, but they have also 
participated in medical, educational and social work operations. They organized 
emergency teams to treat those wounded, child care during school strikes, and 
supplies for those hampered by a lack of funds or simply unable to shop.51 Most 
notably, women were often found amongst those active in civil unrest, supplying 
demonstrators with necessary 'ammunition,' food and water. During the first ten 
months of the uprising, they accounted for 20-25% of all casualties incurred.52
Activism also cut across social class, with the middle class - merchants, 
professionals and small industrialists - assisting in the maintenance of the intifadah. 
Merchants adhered to strike calls, professionals reduced or cancelled client fees or 
offered free advice to the community, and industrial employers retained their 
employees at normal salaries regardless of fluctuating market conditions.53
Accordingly, economic resistance has been a primary facet of the intifadah, 
one which is rarely alluded to in the media. Prior to the intifadah, the Palestinian 
economy had become heavily dependent on Israel for trade and employment; 
military regulations required permits for all forms of economic endeavours, down to 
the planting of a single tree.54 Palestinians were allowed to sell selected products to 
Israel, but only if they met Israeli standards and/or did not compete with Israeli 
products; this practice eliminated most goods, except for produce - such as olives - 
which were not cultivated in commercial quantities by Israel. Palestinians were also
51 Peretz, Intifada, pp. 96-97.52 Sayigh, "The intifadah continues," p. 28.53 Ibid., p. 29.54 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 18; Fawzi Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 133-138.
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curtailed from exporting goods to the European market, lest it compete with similar 
Israeli products.55 Consequently, in 1986 Israel maintained a trade surplus of $491 
million with the West Bank and Gaza. This represented 10.9% of total Israeli 
exports and 89.4% of the territories' imports, making the territories Israel's second- 
largest export market after the United States.56 In 1987, Israel's trade surplus with 
the West Bank and Gaza was $802 million.57
By the mid-1980s, more than half of Gaza's work force and one third of West 
Bank labourers earned their livelihood from across the Green Line. Moreover, 
because agricultural labourers were attracted to work opportunities in Israel, land 
under cultivation decreased and Palestinian agriculture lost one-third of its share of 
GNP. This had a profound effect on the Palestinian community, for "uncultivated 
land is subject to confiscation. Israel has taken 51% of the land and 70% of the 
water in the West Bank and Gaza since 1987."58
The intifadah has encouraged all sectors of the community to identify 
economic hardship with sumud, or steadfastness against the occupation.59 Emphasis
55 McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 112.56 Benvenisti, 1987 Report, pp. 10-11.57 Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 51.58 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 18; Gharaibeh, The Economies o f the West Bank, pp. 59-82. Raja Khalidi expounds: "More than any other issue of Arab development in Israel, that of agriculture has been the focal point for conflict and 
controversy, even from before 1948. The crucial issues of ownership and access to land and water have placed the 'agrarian question' at the forefront of the concerns of generations of Zionist and Palestinian policy makers, activists and farmers. For the Zionist movement and Israel, the acquisition and exploitation of the land was a major element in the successful establishment of the state, and agriculture represented a significant growth centre in the economy for many years. For the 
predominantly peasant Palestinian Arab population, agriculture was historically their main pillar of subsistence. The land has since become the basis for maintaining an existence in their country as well as a highly emotive symbol of 
national identity.. . .  The appropriation of land previously owned by Palestinian Arab peasants, either refugees or new Israeli citizens, provided Jewish agriculture with a vast resource that otherwise would have been difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain." Raja Khalidi, The Arab Economy in Israel: The Dynamics o f a Region's 
Development, (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 65-66.
59 Grossman explains,"Sumud expresses tenacity and stamina, and a sort of passive combativeness, gritting one's teeth to keep from giving in, and to keep from losing one's mind. Sumud means to bow one's head and live, somehow, until the storm
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has been placed on self-reliance, a willingness to accept austerity, and an adjustment 
to lower living standards to demonstrate solidarity for the Palestinian cause. With 
notable success, Palestinians have boycotted Israeli products, from cigarettes to 
clothes to cars. "It became a point of honour for shopkeepers to reject stocks of 
Israeli items and for customers to demand Palestinian replacements for them."60 
Luxury items - such as video-cassettes and televisions - as well as commodities that 
had become basics - such as soap, candy, soft drinks, and meat - have declined from 
household use. In addition, Palestinians have been encouraged to increase local 
production (i.e., become self-sufficient by growing vegetables and/or raising 
animals) to replace boycotted goods and to attempt to stem the 'taking' of land by 
Israel. Clearly, some efforts have been more successful than others, but Peretz 
argues that these measures have contributed to increased morale and national 
consciousness more than to any self-sustaining 'alternative economy.'61 As a result 
of this new Palestinian economic consciousness, sales of Israeli products fell from 
$928 million in 1987 to $650 million in 1988, and Israel's balance of trade with the 
territories plummeted to $42 million from $802 million.62 Furthermore, since 1987 
farmers in the occupied territories have been allowed to make direct sales to 
European markets at the insistence of the European Economic Community 
(EEC).63
passes." David Grossman, The Yellow Wind, trans. Haim Watzman, (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1988), p. 146.
Binur, too, notes," . . .  sumud is a more basic form of resistance growing out of the idea that merely to exist, to survive and remain on one's land, is an act of defiance, especially when deportation is the one thing the Palestinians fear most." Yoram Binur, My Enemy, My Self, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 177. Also see Bill and 
Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, p. 307.™ Peretz, Intifada, p. 100.
61 Ibid. For a further discussion of the intifadah's economic aspects, see Judith Gabriel, "The Economic Side of the Intifadah," Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, Autumn 1988, pp. 198-213.62 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 20.63 Peretz, Intifada, p. 10.
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The final facet of broad-based support for the intifadah has been exemplified 
by its leadership, for although the uprising manifest itself spontaneously, an 
organized grassroots leadership soon emerged. Initially, local neighbourhood 
committees were established to assist with the immediate needs of the intifadah. 
Emergency care was arranged for rising casualties, food and other supplies were 
organized for those people who had their homes sealed or destroyed, and child care 
was needed following school closures. Increased responsibility soon followed, 
including caring for public hygiene, providing alternative education, distributing 
agricultural produce, and maintaining 'guard duty' against approaching Israeli troops 
or settlers. These committees became " . . .  the backbone of the uprising, comprising 
as many as a hundred small committees in each of the major cities and up to ten in 
every refugee camp and village. The process of leadership developed from the base
"64up.
The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) subsequently 
developed to synthesize and coordinate activities between the various communities; 
it soon demonstrated adroitness as well as authority in directing the uprising. So as 
to avoid arrest, the UNLU has refused to disclose its identity, and thus far, its 
members have been successful in eluding Israeli authorities. By far the most 
tangible evidence of UNLU leadership has been in the production and distribution 
of periodic leaflets, or bayanat. These leaflets represent the primary source of 
information regarding the uprising, and instruct the various Palestinian communities 
on their roles in sustaining the intensity of the intifadah.65 For example, 
Communique no. 16 of 13 May 1988 articulates:
64 Daoud Kuttab, "Beyond the Intifada: The Struggle to Build a Nation," The Nation,
17 October 1988.65 For a brief discussion of the leaflets, see Helena Cobban, "The PLO and the Intifada," Middle East Journal, vol. 44, no. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 208-211.
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To the Masses of our People, forty years have passed since the eviction of our people 
from its homeland. . . . The current national revolution and the sacrifices that it has 
entailed have succeeded in obtaining international recognition of our legitimate 
national rights. . . . We salute the heroic role the people of the refugee camps in the 
Gaza Strip have played in escalating the uprising. . . . We urge the intensification of 
strikes against the police and collaborators. . . . We urge the escalation of the refusal 
to pay taxes.. . .  We call upon our people to intensify the boycott against Israeli goods 
for which there are no [s/c] local substitutes or with which they can dispense. . . . We 
call for complete adherence in all areas to the commercial strike and to the schedule 
permitting the opening of places of business between 9 a.m. and 12 noon. . . .  At a 
time when we commemorate the painful anniversary of our dispersion and mark, 
along with the Muslim world, the Feast of al Fitr we call upon our people to hold 
prayers in memory of the martyrs of the uprising. . . . May the banner of the Uprising 
flutter over the path of liberation and independence. Long live our glorious uprising!
We shall be victorious!66
The ascendancy of the UNLU is significant because it manifests a new 
development in the self-determined and self-reliant efforts of the Palestinian 
community. Prior to the intifadah, some disquiet was vocalized with respect to the 
PLO leadership having "become the property of the Palestinian middle classes in the 
diaspora and that many of the leadership led relatively luxurious lives, insulated 
from the realities of nation building as these were experienced under occupation."67 
With the realization that the intifadah represented more than another passing phase 
in the "Arab-Israeli" conflict, the UNLU has maintained its autonomy, and has 
proven its capabilities as a new force to be reckoned with, in that it was established 
from within the territories. Many analysts note the UNLU's important stature as 
frontline combatants in the struggle for a Palestinian state in relation to what could 
be accomplished by a factional leadership of Palestinians abroad.68
Nevertheless, such new leadership was not meant to discount the importance, 
involvement, or commitment of the PLO in the uprising. A partnership evolved 
between the two, whereby decision-making processes could be accomplished with
66 Communique no. 16, 13 May 1988, in Facts Weekly Review (Jerusalem), no. 10, 8-21 May 1988, as cited in McDowall, Palestine and Israel, pp. 4-5.67 McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 121.68 Peretz, Intifada, p. 89.
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the consent of both. Accordingly, UNLU communiques have remained emphatic in
their recognition of the PLO, as well as unequivocal that all Palestinians, both inside
and outside of Palestine, are represented by the PLO.69
In effect, most analysts agree that the intifadah has become a symbol of the
'maturing' of Palestinian national consciousness, of a new self-confidence and sense
of unity of purpose. Walid Khalidi notes:
After four decades since the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians have been 
pushed and pulled together by a multitude of shared experiences which have created a 
sense of national community rare in the Middle East. . . . [It] has transcended 
geographic dispersion, village, clan and sectarian loyalties, as well as the pressures of 
Arab host governments and Israeli occupiers. The Palestinians . . . are irreconcilable 
to living in a limbo of permanent statelessness. As Israel is here to stay, the 
Palestinians are here to stay, too.70
Porat, an Israeli scholar, agrees that "this is the first time that there has been a
popular action, covering all social strata and groups.. . .  The whole population is
rebelling, and this is creating a common national experience."71 Indeed, the
intifadah has reflected an increased Palestinianization of the conflict, whereby all
Palestinians have been actively engaged in a national struggle for their self-
determination, for an acknowledgement of their history and identity, and for the
validity of their homeland - manifest in a Palestinian state.
Yasir Arafat, himself, recognized this new dimension of Palestinianization:
. .  . [It] should be emphasized that the present situation of Palestinians does not differ 
from their past in terms of the gravity and complexity of problems. However, it 
should be pointed out that what has changed in this sense are, in fact, the Palestinians 
themselves.72
69 Sahliyeh states: "This . . .  should not be taken to mean that the Palestinians in the occupied territories are about to abandon the PLO. On the contrary, the vast 
majority of these Palestinians envisage the PLO as a symbol of Palestinian national unity. Many West Bank youths strongly identify with the ideology of Palestinian nationalism, [and] are firmly committed to finding a solution to the problem of the Palestinians in and outside the occupied territories. Such attitudes lend more support to the PLO___ " Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership, p. 184.70 Walid Khalidi, "Toward Peace in the Holy Land," Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4, Spring 1988, p. 772.Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1427, 12 March 1988, as cited in Peretz, 
Intifada, p. 78.72 Arafat, "Significance of the Proclamation," p. 9.
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As such, just as the Palestinians in the occupied territories have maintained their 
resolve to continue the intifadah, Arafat and the Palestine National Council (PNC) 
have attempted to refine their disposition toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 
June 1988, a statement calling for accommodation with Israel was first presented at 
an Arab League summit, and then printed under the authorship of Bassam Abu 
Sharif (special advisor to Arafat) in the New York Times; it was considered to be a 
first step toward conciliation by Arafat.73 The text included the following passages:
Israel's objectives are lasting peace and security. Lasting peace and security are also 
the objectives of the Palestinian people. No one can understand the Jewish people's 
centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it means to be 
stateless and the object of the fear and prejudice of the nations.. . .  [We] know what it 
feels like when human beings are considered somewhat less human than others and 
denied the basic rights that people around the globe take for granted. We feel that 
no people - neither the Jewish people nor the Palestinian people - deserve the abuse 
and disenfranchisement that homelessness inevitably entails. We believe that all 
peoples - the Jewish and the Palestinian included - have the right to run their own 
affairs, expecting from their neighbours not only non-belligerence, but the kind of 
political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure. . . .
The PLO . . . does accept Resolution 242 and 338. What prevents it from saying so 
unconditionally is not what is in the Resolutions, but what is not in them . . . the 
national rights of the Palestinian people.74
At its November 1988 meeting in Algiers, the PNC proclaimed its Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 
(1967) and 338 (1973) by a majority of 253 to 46, recognized Israel's right to exist, 
and renounced terrorism.75 Arafat then detailed this new policy for the U.N. 
General Assembly in Geneva in December.76 The primary goals of the Palestinians 
have remained clear - negotiations at an international conference, which will include
73 Jerome Segal, Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace, (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1989), p. 43.
74 Bassam Abu Sharif, "Arafat's Aide, on Israel," New York Times, 22 June 1988, p. A27.
5 For an 'insider's view' of the PNC meeting, an interview of competing groups within the PLO highlights the spectrum of opinion of Arafat's initiative. George Stein, "The spectrum of Palestinian opinion," The Middle East, no. 173, March 1989.76 Note also that because the United States would not provide Arafat (deemed a 'terrorist') with a visa to enter the country, the General Assembly moved temporarily from New York to Geneva for the first time in history to enable Arafat to set out the fundamentals of the initiative.
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the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, leading to an end to the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the eventual establishment 
of a Palestinian state. The PLO initiative, however, introduced a 'revolutionary' 
understanding of its historical objectives. Palestinians have confronted their 
'reality' - i.e., that coexistence, better known as the 'two-state solution,' can be a 
viable alternative to the violence and 'homelessness' they have endured for so many 
years. The Palestinians' attempt at 'peace' necessarily involves giving up its long- 
cherished goal of a unified secular democratic state of Arabs and Jews in the whole 
of Palestine.77
77 "It's all up to George now," The Middle East, no. 170, December 1988, p. 13.
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III
ISRAEL: 
'MANAGING' THE INTIFADAH
Israel, conscious of its history and geneology of identity, has remained wary 
of the intifadah and Palestinian intent. Life in Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and 
Gaza is viewed through the lenses of security and territorial depth, which 
Palestinians have disrupted with their acts of 'violence.' For Yitzhak Shamir, the 
intifadah is the latest ruse by Palestinians in their mission to annihilate the Jews.78 
Any discussion of the 'Palestinianization' of the conflict or of an increasingly 
moderate PLO has been dismissed as mere folly. Shamir asserts: "The basis of the 
conflict has remained the same. The change has been one of tactics."79
International legal opinion maintains that Israel is an occupying regime in 
the territories and, therefore, that its administration is subject to the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the 
protection of civilian populations under military occupation.80 In their view, 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza are "in the hands of an occupying power of 
which they are not nationals."81 Israel has continued to reject provisions of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, and instead bases its claims on the borders set during 
the British mandatory period (1920-1948). Israel insists that neither Jordan nor
78 Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," p. 359.
79 Ibid. Note also, however, that Shamir refused to support the Camp David Accords. Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 36.80 Regarding Israel's 'interpretation' of the Hague Convention and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, McDowall notes that "No other State agrees with this position." 
David McDowall, The Palestinians, (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1987), 
pp. 18-23. For further clarification, see Raphael Israeli and Rachel Ehrenfeld, "Between the Peak and the Pit: Human Rights in Israel," Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, vol. 13, no. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 424-425; Shaw Dallal, "Israeli Human Rights Violations and Palestinian Violence," Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, vol. 14, no. 2, Winter 1987, p. 116; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 1432.Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 45.
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Egypt can uphold legal claims to the land of Palestine, because the West Bank and 
Gaza are not 'enemy territory,' and as such, Israel maintains exclusive legal and 
moral rights to the whole of Palestine.82 "This common perception thus vitiates any 
rights of the [Palestinians]. . .  to establish an independent political entity within the 
borders of former mandatory Palestine because all the country belongs to the Jewish 
people."83
Despite dismissing the applicability of the Geneva Convention, Israel 
contends that it does abide by the Convention's 'humanitarian' provisions, whereby 
the occupying power is accountable for the protection of persons under 
occupation.84 Actions prohibited under such circumstances include: any measures 
of brutality, whether applied by military or civilian agents; collective punishments 
and reprisals against protected persons or their property; forcible transfers or 
deportations; and unlawful confinement or deprivation of rights of fair and regular 
trial.85 However, Israeli policy has seemed to demonstrate otherwise. In 1987, for 
example, Israel requested that ex-Supreme Court President Landau head a special 
judicial commission to examine alleged human rights abuses in the occupied 
territories. The Landau Commission confirmed, among other human rights 
violations, that the Shin Bet (Israel's Internal Security Service) had "for many years 
illegally used physical and psychological pressure to obtain confessions from security 
suspects."86 Nonetheless, the report recommended that, in appropriate
82 Israel maintains that Jordan's prior annexation of the West Bank was illegal.
Ibid., p. 45.83 Peretz, Intifada, pp. 5-6. Benvenisti adds, "The remaining one-and-a-half million Palestinians are citizens of a foreign state (in the West Bank) or stateless altogether 
(in Gaza). They are deprived of all political rights, ostensibly because they are under military occupation, though even their rights under international conventions governing military occupation are not assured since the government of the republic does not recognize the application of these conventions to the territories." Benvenisti, 1987 Report, p. 71.84 Israeli and Ehrenfeld, "Between the Peak and the Pit," p. 424.85 Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 45.86 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 1378.
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circumstances, limited 'physical and psychological pressure' should be allowed to 
continue. The Israeli cabinet voted to accept the Commission's recommendations, 
and such pressure continued unabated.
Likewise, Israel has maintained an obstinate position with respect to its 
'management' of the intifadah. In January of 1988, Defense Minister Rabin declared 
a new policy of employing "might, power and beatings" to quell the unrest and to 
restore 'order.'87 In September 1988, Rabin introduced the use of 'plastic bullets,' 
stating, "it is our intention to wound as many of them as possible . . .  inflicting 
injuries is precisely the aim of using plastic bullets."88 Subsequent reports of Israeli 
human rights violations abound: houses have been sealed or demolished;89 prisons 
are overcrowded;90 and former West Bank Palestinians, who were not present in the 
territories at the time of the 1968 census conducted after the June war, have been 
refused their requests for reunification.91 Palestinian children have been held by 
Israeli authorities for long periods without charges; they have been beaten, kicked, 
hung by their wrists, forced to stand hooded, denied adequate sleep, food, water, 
medical care, or baths.92 Tear gas is often thrown into homes, and accounted for
87 Peretz, Intifada, pp. 46-47.88 Middle East International, no. 335, 7 October 1988, as cited in McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 15.89 Shaw Dallal, "Israeli Human Rights Violations," p. 117. In December 1989, the Israeli Army announced a new policy in which homes or property belonging to the 
parents of children who throw rocks would be sealed off or impounded. "Israel to Seize Property of Young Stone-Throwers' Parents," New York Times, 22 December 1989, p. A3.90 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports. . .  1988, p. 1380.91 Richard Murphy, Statement, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. Policy in the West Bank and Gaza , 11 December 1987, 100th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1987), p. 6.92 James Lewis, "Arafat and the children," as cited in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Recent Developments in U.S. Human Rights Policy, 10 and 17 February 1988, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1988). p. 114. Furthermore, for purposes of criminal responsibility, the military courts take the view that individuals aged 14 and older must be treated as 'adults.' Gaza Bar Association, "The Imprisonment and Maltreatment of Children in Israel's Military Prisons," as cited in Recent Developments, p. 118.
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sixty-seven deaths by October 1988.93 Shin Bet employed perjury on a routine basis 
to convict those who claimed their confessions were coerced.94 Most have been 
arrested for suspected "Hostile Terrorist Activities," that include writing slogans on 
walls, singing 'nationalist' songs, possessing literature that is 'nationalist' in content, 
raising a flag, making a 'V' (victory) sign with the hand, or displaying colours of the 
Palestinian flag in any form.95 Many Palestinian deaths have resulted from the use 
of high velocity bullets by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during attempts to halt 
incidents involving stones or fleeing suspects.96
Israeli authorities have also attempted to dissipate the tide of Palestinian 
economic resistance. Customs regulations have been tightened; telephone lines cut; 
fuel supplies halted; and shops have been forced open during strikes, and conversely 
welded shut during trading hours. The circulation of funds (i.e., the amount of cash 
allowed in the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan) has been significantly curtailed, 
so as to restrict daily business and commercial transactions, but more importantly to 
cut the flow of PLO funds into the territories.97 The activities of Palestinian farmers 
have been also impeded in the hopes of undermining the territories' economy. In 
October 1988, exporting olive oil to Jordan was blocked. Farmers were prevented 
from irrigating, spraying, or harvesting during the imposition of curfews, resulting in
93 Middle East International, no. 336, 21 October 1988, as cited in McDowall, 
Palestine and Israel, p. 267.94 Gaza Bar Association, "The Imprisonment. . .  of Children," p. 120.95 Said notes that "Father Gabin of Gaza, an artist, was given a six-month prison sentence for using black, green, red, and white in one of his works. Said, After the Last Sky, p. 20.96 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports. . .  1988, p. 1377. Israel often 
discounts such 'stories' of violence, despite 'evidence' to the contrary. For example, in December of 1989, ABC News showed a videotape of Israeli troops in Bethlehem  who fired - without warning - directly at fleeing Palestinian demonstrators. One Palestinian was killed after being hit in the back of the head. While showing this tape, it simultaneously aired a translation of an army spokesperson's account of the 
incident, saying the soldiers had "merely yelled warnings and fired into the air, or at the legs of the demonstrators." "An Israeli Rights Group Fights for Palestinians," New York Times, 19 January 1990, p. A9.97 Peretz, Intifada, p. 72.
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significant crop losses. In Beit Omar, residents were denied permits to market their 
plums and forced to leave them to rot, costing the village an estimated 90% of its 
annual income.98
The refusal to pay taxes as a form of civil resistance has managed to 
confound the Israeli government, with tax collection having decreased by 30% in 
two years (1988-1989)." In response, the military authorities have imposed a 
plethora of punitive measures in an attempt to fracture such resistance. Palestinians 
crossing the border to work in Israel must pass a computerized tax checkpoint. 
Those who owe back taxes find their cars, boats, produce, or equipment impounded, 
as well as accrue daily fines until they pay. In June of 1989, Gazans were required 
to obtain magnetic ID cards (for $10), described as "an honesty card, given to 
anyone who is cleared by the security forces or tax authorities."100 Thirty-thousand 
Gazans failed to qualify.101 Any Palestinian who wishes to travel abroad, or register 
for a driver's license, construction permit, import-export permit, or birth or death 
certificate must apply in person, and present certification from several different 
offices proving that taxes have been paid.102 In 1989, Israel introduced a tax in the 
territories, in which not only cars must be licensed (from $250 to $1000), but donkey 
carts ($250) and bicycles ($15) as well.103
In one of the most well-known efforts to break a tax revolt, military 
authorities 'laid siege' to the village of Beit Sahur, a predominantly middle-class 
Christian community, for forty-two days in 1989. Telephone and road links were 
cut, and a nightly curfew was imposed. Few craftsmen and merchants paid their
98 Middle East Report, no. 154, p. 11, as cited in Mendelsohn, A Compassionate 
Peace, p. 66.99 Jackson Diehl, "Israel Lifts Siege in Tax Boycott," Washington Post, 1 November1989, p. A35.100 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 19.101 Ibid102 Peretz, Intifada, p. 72.
103 Rouhana, "The Other Intifada," p. 20.
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taxes - a mere $25,000 was collected - whereas an estimated $1.5 million in personal
property from shops and homes was confiscated.104 Furthermore, Israeli officials
stated that forty merchants were arrested, thirty-five were indicted on criminal
charges and four had been tried and sentenced to fines of $2000 or 180 days in
jail.105 Nonetheless, this particular effort to break a tax revolt was largely
unsuccessful, further cementing a common Palestinian identity:
The Israeli crackdown here was intended to liquidate one of the most concentrated 
centers of resistance in the intifadah,... and discourage the spread of massive acts of 
civil disobedience. Yet while the operation severely damaged the economic base of 
the town, . . .  it had succeeded only in making Beit Sahur into a symbol of peaceful 
resistance that could help revive the intifadah elsewhere.106
In light of the visible 'failure' of the Beit Sahur effort, and the ostensible 
successes of others, Israel has suffered extensive economic costs. Reserve duty has 
been extended from forty-five to sixty days, and the number of soldiers in the 
territories has been increased by five times, accounting for at least $120 million per 
month, or almost $1.5 billion annually in increased military and police 
expenditures.107 With approximately two-thirds of its employees from the 
territories, the construction industry has suffered immense losses. As a result, 
housing prices rose by nearly a third during 1988-1989.108 Citrus growers, too, are 
dependent on workers from the territories. Textile and shoe industries have also 
suffered. Tourism declined by approximately 15-25%.109 Moreover, insurance rates 
have increased in response to the large number of fires, often attributed to
104 Diehl, "Israel Lifts Siege," p. A35.105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.107 Lee Hamilton, "Challenges for United States Policy in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, vol. 43, no. 1, Winter 1989, p. 13; Mark Cohen, "U.S. Legal 
Involvement in Violations of Palestinian Rights," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 18, 
no. 3, Spring 1989, pp. 76-95.108 Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1428, 19 March 1988; no. 1466,
10 December 1988; no. 1494, 24 June 1989, as cited in Peretz, Intifada, p. 149.109 Hamilton, "Challenges for United States Policy," p. 13; Mendelsohn,A Compassionate Peace, p. 69; Peretz, Intifada, p. 151.
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'nationalist arson.'110 In 1988, inflation rose to 32%, and in June 1990, 
unemployment in Israel reached 9.3%, the highest in years.111 Approximately 
500,000 Israelis were classified as living below the poverty line in January 1990.112 
In effect, with a debt to GDP ratio of more than 100%,113 Israel cannot afford the 
2-4% losses in GDP that it has incurred since the beginning of the intifadah.114
Public attitudes and perceptions regarding the intifadah have indicated an 
increased polarization across the broad Jewish community. For some who have 
reflected upon the uncanny parallels between Palestinian 'history' and Jewish 
'history,' continued occupation over and hostility toward another people is perceived 
as an aberration of the 'democratic' society Israel so desires. Accordingly, they have 
expressed their dissatisfaction and disappointment with the government's handling 
of security in the territories. 'Peace' groups have emerged with prodigious 
regularity, and at least seventy-five groups have been identified, some of which have 
become quite influential.115 Included in this list is the Council for Peace and 
Security, formed in 1988 by ex-general Aharon Yariv, a former chief of military 
intelligence. The Council, which boasts the membership of more than two hundred 
retired senior officers of the Israeli Defense Forces,116 asserts that Israel's security
110 Peretz, Intifada, p. 150.111 Jill Smolowe, "Come One, Come All," Time, vol. 135, no. 25, 18 June 1990, p. 58.112 Drew Harrison, "Deadlock on all fronts," The Middle East, no. 183, January 1990, p. 7.113 International Institute of Strategic Studies, "The Middle East and North Africa," in The Military Balance 1988-1989, in Pacific Defence Reporter, (Prahan: Peter 
Isaacson, Dec. 1988/Jan. 1989), p. 149; Ira Sharkansky, The Political Economy of Israel, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 23-32.
114 Mohammed al Dhaher, "George Habash: 'Yes, b ut . . . , '" The Middle East, no. 180, October 1989, p. 15; Sayigh, "The intifadah continues," p. 41.115 The motto of the Peace Now movement seems particularly appropriate for those who desire 'peace' in Israel and in the occupied territories: "Better land for peace than a piece of land." For a more in-depth analysis of Peace Now and other peace movements, see Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Wither Israel? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 142-170; Myron Aronoff, Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict, (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 1989), pp. 93-121.
116 Included in the Council are 36 retired or reserve major-generals, 84 retired brigadiers, and more than 100 retired colonels. Peretz, Intifada, p. 139.
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does not depend on the continued occupation of the territories, and furthermore, 
that such occupation may indeed be detrimental to security.117
The number of conscientious objectors has also increased. In 1989, several 
reserve units demonstrated against "their illogical and immoral burden of reserve 
duty in the territories."118 Such apprehension with suppressing the intifadah is 
exemplified by an IDF reservist - an immigrant from England who had been the 
national secretary of a Zionist youth movement while at Cambridge - following his 
experiences in the unit that occupied Kabatiya:
The troops moved into Kabatiya's school to 'administer' things. Desks, textbooks, 
school materials - all are discarded, dumped in a big pile, as the school seethes with 
sweating bodies. . . . The battalion commander tells us that [the inhabitants] remain 
under curfew until they are 'broken,' whatever that m eans.. . .  An obscene situation as 
I chase down a side road after a nine-year-old who had spotted a piece of bread in the 
gutter. . . . The roughness of the commands as we scream maniacally at women to 
shut their curtains. Bear in mind, 11,000 residents, an average of ten people to a 
family, confined to boiling, cramped living quarters twenty-four hours a day. . .  .
I've been branded as soft-hearted. . . . Remarkable moment as soldiers steal 
vegetables from Arab fields, and can't understand when I say that you can't do that.
You can't arrest ten-year-olds for picking tomatoes after curfew (their own tomatoes), 
and then laughingly take them yourself.
The biggest disillusion for me are the officers. I think they actually enjoy it: the 
power, the control and, above all, the humiliation.
The humiliation goes on all the tim e.. . .  Humiliation of old men who are trying to 
sneak into the fields at night to save two kilos of rotting peppers, caught by my 
officers and sent to Jenin for 'correction.'
Tonight my first view of dehumanization. I escorted a group of teenagers to Jenin 
detention centre. Supposedly they had stepped into their yards during curfew. On 
arrival in Jenin the guard asked me, 'How many dogs have you brought?' Once the 
man opposite you is a dog, anything go es.. . .
Among the soldiers, a depressing routine of almost wild abandon. Everybody here 
makes up their own rules. The younger officers see our job here as some kind of 
game, and their behaviour ranges from callousness to pure sadism. . .  ,119
In contrast to such 'dovish' views above, a substantial majority of the Israeli 
population has tended to gravitate toward the other end of the spectrum, where 
historical memories of annihilation still reign strong. For example, Israelis surveyed
117 Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, p. 30.118 Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1479, 18 March 1989, as cited in Peretz, Intifada, p. 133.119 Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1455, 24 September 1988, as cited in Peretz, pp. 123-124.
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in March 1989 believed that, if the opportunity arose, the 'Arabs' would indeed 
"commit a holocaust against the Jews in Israel."120 Although 58% were amenable to 
conducting a dialogue with the PLO, a mere 18% believed the PLO was ready to 
make concessions for peace.121 In another survey, 89% did not believe that "Arafat 
was interested in peace."122 A poll conducted in August 1988 revealed that 49% of 
Jewish Israelis favoured population 'transfer' as the preferred means to preserve 
"the democratic and Jewish nature of the state."123 Similarly, a February 1990 survey 
demonstrated a further hardening of opinion against the intifadah. More than half 
said they believed "security agents investigating Palestinian activities should be 
allowed to use techniques that would be illegal if used against Jews."124 More than 
fifty percent also believed that "the press should be prohibited from writing about or 
photographing mistreatment of Arabs by soldiers."125
Such surveys, though never completely able to provide a definitive answer, do 
serve as useful indicators for analysing long-term trends within Israeli public 
opinion; and with the intifadah now well into its third year, it seems evident that the 
fracturing of Israeli society has become acute. For a significant portion of the
120 Joel Brinkley, "Majority in Israel Oppose PLO Talks Now, A Poll Shows,"
New York Times, 2 April 1989, p. A18.121 Note that the question regarding an Israel-PLO dialogue is qualified by the clause, "if the PLO officially recognizes Israel and ceases terrorist activities." More importantly, however, is the fact that the survey was conducted after Arafat and the PLO had recognized Israel and rejected the use of terrorism.122 Peretz, Intifada, p. 121.
123 Glenn Frankel, "Expulsion of Arabs Favored," Guardian Weekly, 13 November
1988, p. 18.124 Joel Brinkley, "Israel Postpones Peace-Plan Vote," New York Times, 8 March1990, p. A5.125 Ibid. It is also interesting to note that "most Israelis perceived the uprising only in terms of its violence and were unaware of its nonviolent aspects. Like the world at large, they saw the uprising through television images of petrol bombs, the masked shabab, and the confrontation between Israeli soldiers and screaming, stone-throwing youths. Few were aware that the Palestinian resistance involved nonpayment of taxes, boycott of Israeli products, and mass organization for communal social action. Despite the wide press coverage of IDF actions in the territories, most Israelis believed that the occupation was beneficial to the 
Palestinians, that it raised their living standards and taught them democracy, 
perhaps at the cost of some occasional discomfort." Peretz, Intifada, p. 121.
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population, historical memories of pogrom and holocaust buttress their perception
that the intifadah is yet another threat to the future existence of the Jewish people.
Yet, they have had to recursively validate such experiences within the context of an
uprising which has consciously disclaimed the use of armed force.
Within this framework of Palestinian civil resistance, quelling the uprising
has remained elusive for the Israeli government, but the number of Jewish lives lost
has been nominal,126 so 'management' has thus far seemed to be an 'acceptable'
manner in which to deal with this reality. Peretz states:
The fact that few had suffered led to acceptance of the situation, reinforced by 
persistence of the national self-image: Israel as the only democracy in the Middle 
East; 'purity of arms' in the IDF; equality of all citizens; the Arabs against peace and 
the Jews for it.127
Regardless of whether the intifadah is 'quelled' or 'managed,' however, Israeli public 
opinion has hardened, and shows no sign of abating.128 With this in mind,
McDowall aptly concludes, "the message for Palestinian citizens is that they are 
generally unwelcome."129
This polarization (or 'paralyzation') of Israeli society was further mirrored by 
Israel's dilemmas over its leadership during the first half of 1990. Because the 
electoral process is such that members are elected at large - that is, any party
126 Such tallying of lives lost should seemingly remain irrelevant in the context of the whole 'Jewish experience.'127 Cohen labels such a response as the "psychology of self-deception," whereby "many Israelis find it literally impossible to believe that their own people - sons, brothers, husbands, friends - could do something like drag a fifteen-year-old boy from his home, blindfold him, line him up against a wall and break his arms and legs. This information is threatening, so it slips into the black holes [of the mind].Or else, it is repackaged in a more acceptable way, so that we insist that these cases are few and isolated, that they are being stopped now; that the media always 
emphasize and exaggerate these sorts of occurrences; that the army is being
provoked beyond all endurance___The point of neutralization or repackaging is
not to deny responsibility, but to deny reality." Peretz, Intifada, pp. 157-158.128 In an unusual twist of irony, more than 150 angry Israelis mobilized around the home of a Jewish legislator; they threw stones and chanted "Arab lover!" and "Death to the Arabs!" in response to his founding of an organization which monitors 'human 
rights' abuses in the territories. "An Israeli Rights Group Fights for Palestinians,"
p. A9.129 McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 241.
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receiving one percent of the vote obtains representation in the Knesset - no party
has ever taken more than 38% of the vote, and it follows that no party has ever been
able to form a government without taking other parties into coalition.130 This
structural 'weakness' "reached a climax in 1984 when neither Labor nor Likud could
form a government without being heavily compromised between constituent
ideologies and with only the narrowest of majorities in the Knesset."131 The
National Unity Government (NUG) - a national coalition between Labor and Likud
- was subsequently formed. Due to such an arrangement, though, fundamental
divisiveness between left and right resulted in numerous altercations, and few
accomplishments. The growing polarization of Israeli society further manifest itself
in the 1988 election in which fifty-two days of negotiation brought merely a reprise
of a divisive NUG.132 Six years after its inception, Diehl notes:
. . .  '[NJational unity' has become a political institution to which Israel is both enslaved 
and addicted, an unhappy marriage of left and right that has served to postpone rather 
than implement painful decisions. It is a union that the country's politicians have 
professed to loathe yet have hesitated to dismantle, fearful of the forces of internal 
conflict that may be released.133
Ever-cognizant of the uprising's tenacity, Labor and Likud could agree on 
little from within this framework. This internal paralysis created ambiguous policies 
and an indefinite postponement of a means to 'deal with' the Palestinians. Peres 
favoured compromise, Shamir advocated suppression. In March 1989, however, 
Shamir did offer an initiative during his visit to the United States;134 though unlike 
the 'two-state solution' proposed by the PLO, Shamir reaffirmed that Israel "cannot
130 Ibid.131 Ibid.132 See Harold Waller, "The 1988 Israeli Election: Proportional Representation with a Vengeance," Middle East Review, vol. 21, no. 4, Summer 1989, pp. 9-17; Don Peretz and Sammy Smooha, "Israel's Twelfth Knesset Election: An All-Loser Game," Middle East Journal, vol. 43, no. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 348-405; Robert 
Freedman, "Religion, Politics, and the Israeli Elections of 1988," Middle East Journal, vol. 43, no. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 406-422.133 Jackson Diehl, "Israel's Era of Coalition Nears End," New York Times, 23 March 
1990, p. A16.134 The Shamir Plan will be discussed more fully in the next section.
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lend [itself] to any steps that will result in a Palestinian state, which is a prescription 
not for peace but for war."135 Shamir later avowed that "the intifadah will never 
force Israel to change its policies and it will never do so even if [the uprising] lasts 
for ten years," and added that he would rather meet with the devil than with the 
PLO.136
In turn, the PLO expressed its reservations with the 'Shamir Plan' because it 
deems itself the legitimate representative of the Palestinian community. Indeed, a 
1988 study of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip concluded that 75.2% 
supported Yasir Arafat and the PLO as their preferred leader.137 For Palestinians, 
then, being separated into factions would defeat the essence of Palestinian unity 
achieved through the intifadah. This Palestinianization of the conflict, in 
conjunction with a fractured (and fracturing) Israeli leadership, resulted in an 
increasingly mercurial, unstable and provisional Israeli regime. One year after the 
'Shamir Plan' was introduced, the National Unity Government collapsed.138 Thus, 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continued unabated, and the 'peace process' 
remained elusive.
135 Yitzhak Shamir, "Remarks Following Discussions," p. 492.136 Harrison, "Deadlock on all fronts," p. 7.
137 Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Trends in Palestinian Nationalism: 
Moderate, Radical, and Religious Alternatives," Journal o f South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 11, no. 4, Summer 1988, p. 63.138 Shamir became the first to fail a vote of confidence in Israel's history. Drew 
Harrison, "What peace process?" The Middle East, no. 186, April 1990, p. 12.
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IV
THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE
The tangled tale of varied historical memory and identity that claims right 
over the same geographical site is further complicated by a third party which regards 
itself as a 'necessary' interlocutor in the "historic conflict over what they [the Israelis 
and Palestinians] perceive as absolute imperatives - territory, security, and political 
legitimacy."139 Chomsky describes the United States as this party, and goes on to 
argue that it represents the third leg of what he aptly coins "the fateful triangle."140 
This triangle, however, can be depicted as more isosceles than equilateral, for 
Americans display no reservation in acknowledging their 'special affinity' toward the 
Jews, and in embracing their 'special relationship' with Israel.141 With respect to the 
intifadah, the question arises as to whether this uprising has spawned a more critical 
appraisal of Israeli actions and Palestinian claims, or whether Americans have 
remained loyal with their 'compeers' and merely ambivalent to Palestinian 
aspirations. By examining the nature of American support for Israel, it can be 
concluded that despite the rhetoric of a 'hope for lasting Palestinian-Israeli peace,' 
U.S. affinity with Israel remains paramount, and dictates the structure and limits of 
the vista in which any such 'lasting peace' could be negotiated.
139 Richard Murphy, "Middle East Peace: Facing Realities and Challenges," 
Department of State Bulletin, vol. 88, no. 2138, September 1988, p. 45.140 Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, p. 441, comments: "The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians [are] three national entities so disparate in power that it seems absurd to link them in a single phrase."141 Jimmy Carter, for example, stated: "We have a special relationship with Israel.
It's absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that 
our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist in peace. It's a special relationship." Cited in Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 206. Also see Abraham Ben-Zvi, Alliance Politics and the Limits o f Influence: The Case of 
the U.S. and Israel, 1975-1983, (Israel: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1984),p. 9.
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Any general discussion of the tradition of American support for Israel must
necessarily cover notions of historical consciousness, religion, democratic values,
and residual guilt feelings about the fate of European Jewry. These sources of
identification shape the foundation of the U.S.-Israel relationship, and contribute to
the underlying continuity of the United States' 'indulgence' with Israel.142
The U.S. reflects on and empathizes with Israel's historical plight and
democratic desires, and perceives Israel as mirroring its own struggle against
oppression and subsequent desire for a 'homeland,' where "all men [s/c] are created
equal." Reich notes:
There is a historical affinity and similarity of national experience, which includes the 
immigrant and pioneering nature of the two states and their commitments to 
democracy. The U.S. experience in striving to escape persecution and establish an 
independent national homeland has a parallel in a Jewish state in Palestine that 
appears to reaffirm these ideals through absorption and integration of immigrants in 
distress.143
Likewise, the 'historical-religious' collective memory of the American 
populace - cognizant of childhood 'Sunday-school stories' - identifies Jews with the 
Holy Land, and perceives Israel as the manifestation of the prophesy that the Jews 
would return to this promised land. Truman, for example, taken broadly as an 
expression of this 'collective memory,' stated," . . .  that [Palestine] is one part of the 
world that has always interested me, partly because of its Biblical background."144 
Johnson, too, remarked to members of the American Jewish community:
142 Samuel Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change," in William Quandt (ed.), The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1988).143 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 186. Similarly, Laipson states that there is 
"a general American identification with Israel as an advanced democratic society with strong liberal and humanitarian values, and as a 'pioneering' and innovative nation. Ellen Laipson, Israeli-American Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2 April 1990), p. 2.144 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 186. Note that Truman was President when Israel became a state. He gave de facto recognition to this newly created Jewish state within eleven minutes of its proclamation. George Lenczowski, 
American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 
p. 26.
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Most, if not all of you, have very deep ties with the land and with the people of Israel, 
as I do, for my Christian faith sprang from yours. The Bible stories are woven into my 
childhood memories as the gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution 
is also woven into our souls. 45
Reagan, as a more contemporary president, had an even more fervent millenarian
belief that Israel was a necessary outpost to be maintained if the Armageddon
prophesy was to be fulfilled.146
Furthermore, in an effort to assuage the guilt engendered by its contextual
ambivalence to the Holocaust, the U.S. feels a particular moral responsibility
toward Israel, and toward the survival of the Jewish community. Safran states:
Support for Israel was seen as a kind of amends by the world, the W estern nations, 
and the Christian people to the people who suffered that terrible ordeal and as 
providing a refuge for the individuals who survived it.147
Thus, Israel is perceived as a 'like-image state,' with a similar outlook, and
'progressive nature' - one conducive to a world the United States envisions. Ford
commented:
The American people have a great deal of understanding and sympathy and 
dedication to the same kind of ideals that are representative of Israel. And, therefore,
I think we in America have a certain rapport and understanding with the people of 
Israe l.. . .  We have mutual aims and objectives. We have the kind of relationship that 
I think, if expanded world-wide, would be beneficial to all mankind.148
From within a milieu of such strong symbol and myth, it is instructive to note 
the opinion of the general American public since the uprising ensued. Initially, the 
intifadah sorely tested support for 'democratic' Israel as Americans witnessed nightly 
images of violence against Palestinian 'freedom fighters.' Yet the initial outrage 
against the Israeli government's 'disproportionate' response eroded, despite the
145 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 206.146 Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East 
Policy from Truman to Reagan, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
p. 406.*47 Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 572.148 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 185. Abba Eban, former Israeli Foreign 
Minister, also notes the U.S. and Israel's "harmony in democratic values, harmony of historic roots, harmony in spiritual memories, harmony of ideals, and, I am convinced, a profound underlying harmony of interests in this hard and dangerous 
world."
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continuing depiction of Israeli militia using tear-gas and 'plastic bullets.' In April of
1989, more than a year after the intifadah began, support for Israel reached an all- 
time high of 69%; 74% of Americans thought the PLO renounced 'terrorism' only 
for political advantage; 65% declared that "aside from a few regrettable incidents, 
Israel has used a reasonable and appropriate level of force in countering recent 
violence"; and 79% blamed the press for biased treatment of the conflict.149
A similar 'pattern' occurred following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
At first, Americans were chagrined by the 'aggressiveness' of Israeli actions, and by 
the casualties and losses resulting from the war; but this immediate response proved 
to be only short-lived, as pro-'Arab' sympathy declined - despite the slaughter in 
Sabra and Shatila - and pro-Israel sympathy virtually returned to its prewar, pre­
massacre levels.150 Bookbinder avowed:
I remember my own deep personal anguish during those early months. But it did not 
take long for that anguish to be eased and then overtaken, by admiration for the way 
Israel conducted itself at a moment of crisis, and by calmer reflection about what had
. 1S1caused it to take drastic, if ill-advised, action to defend its people.
149 Bard, "Israel: Some Surprising Polls," pp. 45-46. Similarly, referendas were placed on the ballots in four U.S. cities during the 1988 elections. In San Francisco, Cambridge, and Newton, voters were queried on U.S. support for Palestinian statehood; and in Berkeley, citizens were asked if the city should establish a sister- city relationship with a Palestinian refugee camp. In San Francisco, Proposition W 
was rejected by more than 2 to 1. In Berkeley, Measure J was also defeated by more than 2 to 1. The Newton resolution, too, did not receive a majority. Only the Cambridge referendum, though opposed by Representatives Joseph Kennedy II, and 
Barney Frank, Senators John Kerry and Ted Kennedy, and Presidential nominee, 
Governor Michael Dukakis, passed by a margin of 53 to 47 percent. Andrea Barron, "Referenda on the Palestinian Question in Four U.S. Cities," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 18, no. 4, Summer 1989, pp. 71-83.150 Bernard Reich and Gershon Kieval, "Problems and Prospects as Israel Faces the Future," in Bernard Reich and Gershon Kieval (eds.), Israel Faces the Future, (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 16; Nimrod Novik, The United States and Israel: Domestic Determinants of a Changing U.S. Commitment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986),p. 3; Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), p. 306.151 Hyman Bookbinder and James Abourezk, Through Different Eyes: Two Leading 
Americans - a Jew and an Arab - Debate U.S. Policy in the Middle East, (Maryland: 
Adler and Adler, 1987), p. 55.
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Thus, popular support for Israel is ingrained in the American psyche.
Ideological and emotional interest transcend the occasional obstacle - i.e., an
Israeli-committed 'terrorist act or two' - as most U.S. citizens identify with an Israel
being 'forced' to resort to violence to uphold the 'democratic' ideals common to both
peoples. Reich explains:
There is an element of cultural identity that sees Israel as a 'Western' state in a sea of 
feudal, Oriental entities and as a perpetrator of the Judeo-Christian heritage. It is 
perceived as sharing the concept of individual freedom and the right of all individuals 
to live in peace. It is seen as a free, open, and democratic society - a 'showplace of 
democracy' - pursuing peace. It is characterized as a brave, gallant, and young state 
that provides a model of courage and tenacity. Its people have been praised for their 
sacrifice, mettle, industriousness, dedication, determination, and spirit. Israel is seen 
as having achieved substantial progress, despite its precarious existence, and as worthy 
of emulation.152
Moreover, 'American' Jews have played a pivotal role in recursively 
reproducing close 'historical' ties between the United States and Israel. While 
making up a mere 2.7% of the U.S. population, they also represent the world's 
largest Jewish community, and an exceptional feeling of 'closeness' to Israel has 
always existed.153 Yet, the creation of the State of Israel did little to entice these 
Jews to "make aliyah" (literally 'ascend') to 'the promised land'154 - indeed, fewer 
than 1% have immigrated to Israel - but by staying in the U.S., "American Jews have 
ended up performing an invaluable service for the Jewish state."155 For many, Israel 
has become the central focus in shaping Jewish life,156 and the American Jewish 
community is well-organized and committed to the security of Israel, and to the
152 Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 185; Andrea Barron, "Jewish and Arab 
Diasporas in the United States and Their Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy," in Lukács and Battah, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 243.153 Barron, "Jewish and Arab Diasporas," pp. 239-240.154 A 1982 survey revealed that 80% of Jewish Americans denied ever giving any serious consideration to settling in Israel. McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 167. For a further discussion of the American Jewish penchant (or lack thereof) to make 
aliyah, see Zvi Gitelman, Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants, (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 59-69.155 Barron, "Jewish and Arab Diasporas," p. 239.156 Daniel Elazar, Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics o f American 
Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1976), p. 79.
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maintenance of Jewish history and identity.157 Wall goes so far as to claim that 
"Israel is the religion for a lot of American Jews; Israel is the home team, and the 
members of the American Jewish community are the fans."158 In addition to such 
moral support and identification, American Jews contribute almost $2 billion a year 
to Israel.159
As a result of this commitment, members of the American Jewish community 
comprise part of a larger entity simply recognized as 'the lobby'160 among politicians, 
political analysts, the media, and any individual concerned with 'the future of 
Israel.'161 The Israel lobby plays an influential role in the formation of attitudes and 
the formulation of policies concerning Israel and the Middle East. Although the 
lobby is composed of more than eighty organizations,162 the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is considered the principal lobbying organization on 
Capitol Hill. With 55,000 members, a $7 million annual budget, five regional 
offices, and a staff of seventy in Washington, AIPAC exists for a single purpose - it is 
the only officially registered domestic lobbying organization, established on behalf 
of a foreign government for the purpose of influencing legislation regarding U.S.-
157 Furthermore, more than 2100 countrywide Jewish organizations, and over 700 local Jewish federations - almost one organization for every 2500 Jews - exist in the United States. Marshall Breger, "For Ourselves and For Others: Defining Jewish Interests," in Daniel Elazar (ed.), The New Jewish Politics, (Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), p. 57.158 As cited in Mohamed Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid: U.S. Foreign Assistance 
and Aid to Israel, (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 94. Elazar also comments: "For those Jews who aspired to be active in the Jewish community, politics became a participant sport." Daniel Elazar, "The New Jewish Politics," in Elazar, The New Jewish Politics, p. 9.159 Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 86.160 See, for example, Edward Tivnan's aptly titled book, The Lobby: Jewish Political 
Power and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).161 Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 54, comments that "The Israeli 'lobby' is not a lobby in the conventional sense.. . .  It is rather a commitment to a people and a cause, a commitment rooted in powerful bonds of kinship, in the memory of a common history and the conviction of a common destiny."
162 Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 61.
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Israeli relations.163 The New York Times has dubbed AIPAC as "the most powerful, 
best-run and effective foreign policy interest group in Washington."164 Over the 
thirty-nine years since its inception, AIPAC's efforts have contributed to Israel's 
receiving more foreign-aid concessions than any other country;165 to the formation 
of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement;166 to gaining Israel the status of a major 
non-NATO ally;167 and to the closing of the PLO information office in 
Washington.168 AIPAC members have even been 'privy' to witnessing former 
Secretary of State George Shultz lead the crowd in the chant "Hell, no, PLO" at its 
1987 convention.169
U.S. policymakers have been ever-cognizant of the influence wielded by the 
American Jewish community, particularly as it affects the future of their own 
political careers.170 In 1975, for example, AIPAC mobilized Capitol Hill support to 
reverse a decision by President Ford to delay a shipment of arms to Israelis. 
Seventy-six senators responded to AIPAC's call, and sent Ford a strongly-worded 
letter urging him to be "responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic
163 For a detailed description of AIPAC, its objectives, and its accomplishments, see I. L. Kenen (AIPAC's founder), Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in 
Washington, (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981).164 Cited in Edward Glick, The Triangular Connection: America, Israel, and American Jews, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 102.165 Furthermore, between Fiscal Year 1970 and 1977, Congress increased the amount of foreign aid appropriations requested by the Administration by nearly 9 
percent. Reich, The United States and Israel, p. 191.166 Duncan Clarke, "Entanglement: The Commitment to Israel," in Lukács and Battah, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 228.167 Chuck Alston, "AIPAC Working to Shore Up Its Clout With Congress," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 47, no. 7, 18 February 1989, pp. 298-299.
168 Barron, "Jewish and Arab Diasporas," p. 243.169 Alston, "AIPAC Working to Shore Up Its Clout," p. 299.170 Pro-Israeli political action committees (PACs) now contribute the second largest source of funds for Democratic Senatorial candidates. Rex Wintergerter, "The Pro- Israel PACs and the 1988 Elections," Middle East International, no. 336, 21 October1988, p. 16. President Kennedy himself is noted as commenting to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion: "I know I was elected by the votes of American Jews. I owe them my election. Tell me, is there something that I can do for the Jewish people?" Clarke, 
"Entanglement," p. 217.
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needs."171 A few of these senators initially expressed reservations with the letter, but 
later added their signatures. One senator conceded that "the pressure was just too 
great. I caved."172 Another responded, "It's easier to sign one letter than to answer 
five thousand."173
In contrast, incumbent representatives and senators considered 
'unsympathetic' to Israel have lost reelection campaigns due to targeting efforts by 
the lobby. Included in this list are former Representatives Jepsen, McCloskey, and 
Findley, and Senator Charles Percy, former chairperson of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, who voted for the sale of AW ACS to Saudi Arabia.174 Percy's opponent 
reportedly received S3 million - 40% of his campaign funds - from American Jews.175 
Following Percy's defeat, Thomas Dine, AIPAC's executive director, acknowledged 
his organization's role: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to 
oust Percy. And the American politicians - those who hold public positions now and 
those who aspire - got the message."176 Elazar adds, "Support for Israel is certainly 
considered a moral imperative and politicians who deviate from such support are 
found by many Jewish activists to be morally wanting."177 In effect, political weight 
amongst the Jewish community is substantial, if not overbearing, and inevitably 
crosses the mind of a senator or two when milling around the cloakroom prior to a
171 Barron, "Jewish and Arab Diasporas," p. 243. Furthermore, some have purported that part of the letter was drafted by AIPAC. Lenczowski, American Presidents,
p. 150; David Pollock, The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 202.172 As cited in Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, p. 67.173 Ibid.174 Ibid., p. 298; Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 88. Also see Paul Findley,They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby, (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985).175 Tivnan, The Lobby, p. 191.176 As cited in Ibid., p. 191.177 Elazar, The New Jewish Politics, p. 10.
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vote. As a congressional staff member noted, "The bottom line is if I am a 
congressman [sic], American Jews are in a position to hurt or help."178
A concomitant effect of the lobby's unparalleled ability to mobilize its 
influence on Capitol Hill is demonstrated by the plethora of 'special benefits' that 
are accrued by Israel within the mountain of measures passed by Congress each 
session. Well-documented is Israel's foreign aid package of $3 billion a year - about 
one-third of all U.S. bilateral aid - in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) ($1.8 billion) 
and Economic Support Funds (ESF) ($1.2 billion).179 Israel is one of few countries, 
however, which receives all of its aid in grants.180 Furthermore, whereas other states 
receive their economic aid quarterly, Israel is the only state which receives all of its 
economic aid at the beginning of each fiscal year; this enables Israel to save between 
$40-$50 million annually in interest,181 but costs the U.S. an estimated $50-60 
million to borrow funds for the early, lump-sum payment.182 Similarly, since 1984, 
Israel has been the only government allowed to spend some of its U.S. military aid in
178 Nora Boustany, "Arab-American Lobby is Struggling," Washington Post, 6 April 1990, p. A10. Moreover, Christison notes that "AIPAC itself has grown tremendously since Reagan's election: its budget has quadrupled, it has increased its access to Congress, and it is now evaluating the possible cabinet appointments of presidential candidates, so that no future president 'can make the mistake' of appointing policymakers who do not fully support Israel." Kathleen Christison, "Blind Spots: Official U.S. Myths About the Middle East," Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, Winter 1988, p. 51.179 Note that in Fiscal Year 1990, The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) was implemented, which reduced Israel's aid by 5.3%. Thus, Israel received $2,824.11 million - $1,129,644 million in ESF and $1,694,466 million in FMS. Clyde Mark, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
6 April 1990), p. 13. For further analyses of American aid to Israel, see Rabie,
The Politics of Foreign Aid, and Mohamed El-Khawas and Samir Abed-Rabbo, 
American Aid to Israel: Nature and Impact, (Vermont: Amana Books, 1984).180 Edward Walker and A. Peter Burleigh, "FY 1990 Assistance Programs for the Middle East and North Africa," (Current Policy No. 1169), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 1989), p. 2.181 John Felton, "Special Treatment for Israel," Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, vol. 48, no. 3, 20 January 1990, p. 197.182 Mark, U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts, p. 7.
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Israel, as opposed to purchasing U.S. goods and services.183 Other 'special benefits' 
include the following:
> The government of Israel receives all ESF funds directly as cash transfers. 
Because U.S. economic aid to Israel is not 'tied' to any specific program, there exists 
no accounting of how the funds are employed.184
> Israel need only set aside FMS funds for current year payments only, as opposed 
to setting aside the full amount necessary to meet the complete cost of multi-year 
purchases. Thus, remaining funds can be used by Israel for any other 'military' 
purpose.185
> The development of the Lavi fighter plane was cancelled in 1987 after Israel had 
received more than $1.5 billion in U.S. subsidies. Yet, for three years, Israel has been 
allowed to continue spending up to $400 million of U.S. aid annually to pay for Lavi 
cancellation costs.186
> As a result of legislation enacted in 1987 allowing foreign countries to refinance 
old U.S. loans, Israel is saving approximately $150 million annually by obtaining new 
loans on the private market at a lower rate of interest than old U.S. loans.187
> The Continuing Appropriation for fiscal year 1985 (PL 98-453) stipulates that 
"annual economic aid to Israel must be equal to or greater than the amount Israel 
must spend to pay off the old military sales loans."188
> Almost $180 million was included in the fiscal 1990 defense spending bill (PL
101-165) to purchase Israeli-made military equipment and to subsidize Israeli 
. 1 8 9weapons research.
> In the fiscal 1990 foreign aid bill (PL 101-167), $165 million was appropriated to 
the Department of Defense to stockpile weapons and equipment in foreign countries 
for emergency use. As much as $100 million in supplies will be stockpiled in Israel.190
These initiatives, as well as other less-evident programs, provided Israel with 
approximately $666 million in additional U.S. financial support in fiscal year 1990.191 
In effect, the political clout wielded by the American Jewish community, in 
conjunction with the depth and magnitude of Congressional interest in Israel,
83 Felton, "Special Treatment," p. 197.84 Mark, U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts, p. 7.85 Ibid.86 Ibid., p. 8, Felton; "Special Treatment," p. 197.87 Felton, "Special Treatment," p. 197.88 Ibid., p. 197; Mark, U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts, p. 7.
89 Felton, "Special Treatment," p. 197.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.
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remains strong.192 As such, it is because of AIPAC and other Jewish organizations' 
interest in Israel that U.S. support for Israel has not dwindled, despite the intifadah 
and regardless of concessions made by the PLO, which cater to the hope that the 
U.S. will assist in a 'peaceful solution' to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The genesis of the intifadah developed at a time when U.S. support for Israel 
was at an all-time high. The 100th Congress was completing its first session of what 
came to be known as "the most pro-Israel Congress ever."193 In 1986, the U.S. and 
Israel voted together in the United Nations General Assembly 91.5% of the time.194 
The Reagan Administration, too, was deemed by Shamir as being "the most friendly 
Administration we have ever worked with."195 Spiegel comments:
Harking back to his career in Hollywood, he [Reagan] held a romantic view of Israel
as a vibrant democracy. As he often told Jewish audiences, he was deeply affected by
movies he had seen while still in the army of American forces entering the
196concentration camps.
Shortly after his inauguration, Reagan declared that Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories were not 'illegal' under international law (as had been the 
'official' U.S. response since 1967), but merely 'unhelpful' and 'ill-advised'; Israel
192 Laufer concludes that "the secret of Israel's success remains the continued support for Israel in American public opinion, and the effective articulation of this support by the organized Jewish community in relation to the administration and 
particularly the Congress." Leopold Yehuda Laufer, U.S. Aid to Israel: Problems and Perspectives, Policy Oriented Publications No. 7, (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis 
Institute for International Relations, U.S.-Israel Project, May 1983), p. 29. Also see Philip Landau, Israel to 1991: Reform or Relapse, Special Report No. 1078, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, April 1987), pp. 50-57.193 Said, After the Last Sky, p. 140; Laipson, Israeli-American Relations, p. 4.194 This voting record contrasted with that of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, 
where the U.S. voted with them 15.3%, 14.2% and 13.6% of the time respectively. 
"AIPAC Policy Statement, 1987," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, Summer1987, p. 113.195 Lenczowski, American Presidents, p. 254.
196 Reagan also commented to Dine, Executive Director of AIPAC: "You know, I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament, and the signs foretelling Armageddon, and I find myself wondering if - if we're the generation that's going to 
see that come about. I don't know if you've noted any of the prophecies lately, but, believe me, they certainly describe the time we're going through." Spiegel,The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 406. Also see Gore Vidal, Armageddon? Essays 1983-1987, (Suffolk: St. Edmundsbury Press Ltd., 1987), p. 110.
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perceived this as an affirmation of its dream of settling in all of Eretz Israel.197 
Following both Israel's attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and its 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, U.S. condemnations often seemed diluted or 
Administration officials often spoke of an 'Arab' provocation leading to an Israeli 
reprisal.198 Ben-Zvi comments that during the early stages of the war in Lebanon, 
"Reagan and his foreign policy advisors acted with marked complacency and 
equanimity - if not muted satisfaction - in view of the destruction of the PLO 
strongholds and infrastructure___"199 In essence:
Although the Lebanon war . . . exposed some serious differences between short-term 
Israeli and U.S. policies, it did not fundamentally alter the Administration's approach 
to Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States. 00
Furthermore, Israel was granted its major non-NATO ally status, and the
U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement and Strategic Cooperation Agreement (SCA-83)
were both concluded during the Reagan Administration, the latter of which needed
no public hearings nor Senate approval because it took the form of a Memorandum
of Understanding.201 Cases of dual Israeli-American citizenship also multiplied
during the 1980s.202 For these reasons, McDowall contends, "Reagan's presidency
may prove to have been the high watermark of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, combining
an unprecedented commitment to military cooperation with an almost wholly
uncritical view of Israel."203
Within this context of unparalleled U.S. domestic support for Israel though,
the genesis of the intifadah ruffled the air with a sense of unease - or so it seemed.
197 John Felton, "Congress Gearing Up to Give Housing Aid to Israel," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 48, no. 7, 17 February 1990, p. 539; Lenczowski, American Presidents, p. 256; David Smith, Prisoners of God: The Modern-day Conflict of Arab and Jew, (London: Quartet Books, 1987), p. 100.1 Lenczowski, American Presidents, p. 267.199 Ben-Zvi, Alliance Politics, p. 41.
200 Laipson, Israeli-American Relations, p. 3.201 Clarke, "Entanglement," pp. 224-229; Lenczowski, American Presidents, p. 261.202 Lenczowski, American Presidents, p. 268.203 McDowall, Palestine and Israel, p. 47.
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Both Congress and the Administration expressed their misgivings with Israeli 
policies in the occupied territories. In particular, U.S. leaders reaffirmed their 
opposition to Israel's decision not to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention, and 
alluded to Israeli human rights violations in subsequent Country Reports.204 Yet, 
many analysts wondered if this was more a mirage than genuine criticism of Israel, 
for when Country Reports were compared, one gained the sense that the Israeli 
report camouflaged what many deemed "flagrant denials of the right to life, [and] 
liberty,. . .  "205 in but a single explanation: "security."206 The duplicity in U.S. policy 
is highlighted when one reflects on the subtle change in their nuance, whereby 
'major violations' became 'major differences'; and the human rights situation for 
Palestinians is described not as 'poor' or 'bad,' but 'complex.'207 Even as Israeli 
officials braced for criticism from these reports, and a decrease in economic and 
security assistance, State Department officials quipped that "in any event, Israel's 
abuses do not constitute such a gross pattern (emphasis added)."208
With regard to Israel's use of force, then, U.S. leaders seemed to be more 
conscious of financially influential interest groups, and of its historical, ideological, 
and emotional ally, than of any overt human rights violations. Kader asserts:
204 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports. . .  1988, pp. 1366-1387, and 
Country Reports. . .  1989, pp. 1423-1425.205 Dallai, "Israeli Human Rights Violations," p. 120.206 The Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights, "A Critique of the U.S. State Department's 1986 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the 1967 Israeli Occupied Palestinian Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, Autumn 1987, p. 161.
207 Ibid., p. 166. The critique continues (p. 161): "The report is ahistorical, inconsistent and selective in its reporting of events. It frequently assumes an official Israeli point of view. The report does document numerous Israeli human rights 
abuses, but within the context of the entire report, the severity of the violations 
documented becomes diminished."208 Robert Pear, "Israel Accedes to U.S. Rights Monitoring," New York Times,26 June 1988, p. A3.
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Paradoxically, elements of domestic politics in the United States which have been at 
the forefront of advocating a foreign policy of human rights have at the same time 
avoided directly addressing the issue of the Palestinians. Domestic American political 
pressures stand as the only explanation for neglecting peace between Israel and the 
Palestinians.209
Indeed, there was no tangible decline in Congress' willingness to finance Israel's 
government, with Israel receiving its customary S3 billion foreign aid package each 
fiscal year since the intifadah began.
At the same time, the U.S. also came to realize that the intifadah was not a 
passing phenomenon, and prompted the Administration to increase its role as a 
'Superpower' in providing a 'peaceful solution' to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The Shultz Plan was subsequently articulated in February 1988. The initiative 
reaffirmed the United States' long-advocated policy (posited by Kissinger in 1975) 
that the conditions for a dialogue with the PLO would involve the PLO's acceptance 
of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the recognition of Israel's right to exist, and the 
renunciation of 'terrorism.' More importantly, Shultz's initiative highlighted the 
significance of the 'land for peace' formula, which would be decided through 
bilateral negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, as 
convened in an international conference.210
The Shultz Plan collapsed within a mere four months, for although Peres 
accepted the initiative, Shamir refused to agree on an international peace 
conference, and argued that the idea of exchanging territory for peace was foreign 
to him.211 The PLO also objected to the initiative, because it neither explicitly 
provided for PLO representation, nor did it mention Palestinian self-determination
209 Omar Kader, "Peace in the Middle East Through Human Rights," Syracuse Journal o f International Law and Commerce, vol. 13, no. 3, Spring 1987, p. 496.
210 See Abraham Ben-Zvi, Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israel Conflict, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).211 William Quandt, "U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Quandt,The Middle East, p. 377. Furthermore, "he criticized the reduction of the transitional period from five (as agreed at Camp David) to three years, and reiterated his view that by returning Sinai to Egypt in 1981 Israel had fulfilled U.N. Resolution 242 and did not feel obligated to relinquish its rule over the West Bank and Gaza." 
Lenczowski, American Presidents, p. 273.
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(crystallized in the notion of "Sovereignty") as an objective. Soon after, in what
many consider to be an unusual move, thirty senators sent a letter to Shultz voicing
their 'dismay' at Shamir's opposition to the 'land for peace' proposal, saying that
"peace negotiations have little chance of success if the Israeli Government's position
rules out territorial compromise."212 Yet with 1988 being an election year,
Congressional and Administration support for Israel continued. Khalidi reflects his
disappointment not only with the plan, but with the all-too-familiar American
response to it, and concludes that the Shultz Plan was an exercise in futility:
. . . [V]ery few authoritative voices have commented on the emperor's abject 
nakedness: indeed, most members of Congress, most presidential candidates, and 
most newspaper editorials gravely commend the 'Shultz Plan,' perhaps mentioning 
some minor shortcoming, but never pointing out that it is no more than a Band-Aid 
on a suppurating wound. Shultz has failed to accept that the Palestinians are a people 
and a central party to the conflict, that they must be independently represented by 
negotiators of their own choice if the conflict is to be resolved, and that Palestinians 
and Israelis must be brought to the point of mutual recognition. Instead, Shultz has 
hewn to the outdated American conventional wisdom on this issue: uncritical 
adoption of Israel's positions on the PLO and on national self-determination for the 
Palestinian people, combined with an almost idolatrous worship of the completely 
irrelevant 'Camp David process' (which has been rejected by the Palestinians.. .  .).213
Moreover, the notion of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, relied upon by
the U.S., fell through when Hussein relinquished Jordan's legal and administrative
claims to the West Bank in July 1988, and turned over full responsibility for the
territories to the PLO. This had the effect of destroying one of the few delegations
'suitable' to Israel and the United States. To then add fuel to a fire already out of
control, Arafat's statement agreeing to all three conditions for a U.S.-PLO dialogue
further scorched the United States' Middle East foreign policy. American leaders
suddenly found themselves overtly having to do the unthinkable - deal with
'terrorists.' Nonetheless, the U.S. (represented by Ambassador Robert Pelletreau)
began its dialogue with the PLO, without the support of the Israeli government.
212 Neil Lewis, "Two American Senators Dispute Criticism of Shamir," New York Times, 7 March 1988, p. A7.213 Rashid Khalidi, "The Uprising and the Palestine Question," p. 511.
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Soon after the official dialogue with the PLO started, the new Bush 
Administration took shape, but from the outset Bush was oft-reminded of the fact 
that he was elected on the most pro-Israel platform in the history of either major 
party to date.214 Many in the American Jewish community voiced concern, however, 
that the Administration's policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict seemed 
largely inconsistent and confusing.215 Dialogue with the PLO continued though, and 
with Arafat's astonishing statement still resounding in its ears, Washington pressed 
Israel for a 'constructive' response. The Israelis reacted to this pressure with the 
Shamir Plan in April 1989. This plan involved free democratic elections among the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, which would eventuate in a delegation to 
negotiate an interim period of 'self-governing administration' in the territories. This 
interim phase would " . . .  provide a vital test of coexistence and cooperation . . .
[and would]. . .  be followed by negotiations for a permanent agreement."216
Nicknamed "the plan with a hole in its heart," it left many dissatisfied.217 
Likud was concerned that elections would inevitably lead to a Palestinian 'state'; 
Labor believed Israel should go one step further and negotiate directly with the 
PLO. The Palestinians objected to the exclusion of the PLO, as well as to the 
ambiguous procedures for conducting such elections. Eighty West Bank leaders 
highlighted their reasons for rejecting the proposal:
214 Thomas Dine, "The Administration: Course Correction Needed," Near East Report, vol. 34, no. 12, 19 March 1990, p. 51; Thomas Dine, "Bush's Assault on Israel," New York Times, 15 March 1990, p. A23.215 Christopher Ogden, "Vision Problems at State . . . Time (Australia), vol. 4, no. 39, 25 September 1989, p. 38. Also see "A Labyrinth of Confusion," The Middle East, no. 178, August 1989, pp. 11-12.216 Yitzhak Shamir, "Remarks Following Discussions," p. 492.217 "The plan with a hole in its heart," The Economist, vol. 312, no. 7610, 8 July 1989, p. 35. Schiff and Ya'ari comment," . . .  just days after returning from Washington 
the prime minister publicly characterized his own peace initiative as just 'an idle
fancy'___Shamir knuckled under to his arch-rivals in the party . . .  by telling the
[Likud Central] Committee, and thereby the world, that his conditions for holding elections were such that no Palestinian could possibly accept the Israeli initiative. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising - Israel's Third Front, trans. Ina Freedman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 319-320.
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Our rejection of the election proposal does not indicate a rejection of elections as
democratic practice, but is the rejection of a project which ignores the essence of the
conflict. The elections proposed by Shamir do not constitute democratic practice
within an entire political process with clearly defined principles: this isolated
occurrence of elections does not illustrate how it will lead to the end of the occupation 
• • • 218 and to Palestinian national independence.
Nevertheless, Washington seemed relieved that the Israeli leadership had 
taken a step - albeit a minute one - to move the peace process 'forward,' and Bush 
reaffirmed the United States' loyalty and commitment to Israel and its efforts. At 
the same time, such unequivocal acceptance of a plan which the Palestinians would 
undoubtedly reject also led to a deterioration of its dialogue with the PLO. Nabil 
Sha'ath, political advisor to Arafat, contends that following Israel's creation of an 
"illusion of reciprocity" with the Shamir Plan, the U.S. truncated its dialogue with 
the PLO to a "dialogue of the deaf'219 - implying that a veneer of superficiality hid 
an uncritical acceptance of Israeli policy toward Palestinians.
In opposition to contentions which argue that the U.S. was merely uncritical 
of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, Secretary of State James Baker, in a 
controversial speech to AIPAC in May 1989, seemed to demonstrate the 
Administration's resolve and insistence that Israel take a more 'moderate' stand:
For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a 
greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza - security and otherwise - 
can be accommodated in a settlement based on Resolution 242. Forswear 
annexation. Stop settlement activity. Allow schools to reopen. Reach out to the 
Palestinians as neighbours who deserve political rights.220
The repercussions following Baker's speech were overwhelming. It was 
labelled an "arm-twisting" speech221 where AIPAC members "listened in silence as
218 As cited in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 18, no. 4, Summer 1989, p. 156.219 Nabil Sha'ath, "Prospects for a Middle East Peace Settlement," Department of International Relations and Peace Research Centre seminar, The Australian National University, 18 September 1989.220 James Baker, "Principles and Pragmatism: American Policy Toward the Arab- Israeli Conflict," (Current Policy No. 1176), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 1989), p. 3.221 "Nearly there, if only . . . The Economist, vol. 311, no. 7607, 17 June 1989, p. 53.
51
Baker recited his demands of Israel,"222 and in which he "even-handedly treated
Israel as the moral equivalent of those dictatorships and terrorist groups that have
been warring on it for four decades."223 Senior Israeli officials voiced displeasure at
Baker's remarks; Shamir called it "useless," and said that Israel "cannot accept"
Baker's statements.224 Congress, too, was anxious to assert its authority, for fear of
reprisals from the American Jewish community. Prompted by AIPAC's rather
impressive 'arm-twisting' of its own, ninety-five senators wrote to Baker, praising
Shamir's plan and urging the Administration to do the same.225 Under such
sustained pressure from Israel, Congress, and the lobby, the Bush Administration
retreated from its 'aggressive posturing,' back to its 'officially' stated position of
supporting the Shamir Plan.226
Three months after it was proposed, however, the Shamir Plan stalled.
Shamir and his Likud party explicitly affirmed their restrictions on the plan, which
effectively circumscribed any future negotiations with the Palestinians. These four
restrictions advocated the following: that Jerusalem Arabs would be excluded from
elections; that the intifadah must end before elections would be held; that Jewish
settlements would continue in the territories; and that Israel would never accept
'foreign sovereignty' of the territories. Shamir also reaffirmed his intent regarding
the only acceptable outcome of his own plan:
We shall not give the Arabs one inch of our land, even if we have to negotiate for ten 
years. We won't give them a thing. . .  . We have the veto in our hands. . . . The status 
quo of the interim arrangement will continue until all the parties reach agreement on 
the permanent arrangement.227
222 "Baker Offers Blunt Words On Mideast Divisions," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 41, no. 21, 27 May 1989, p. 1271.223 "Baker Builds Suspicion," New York Times, 10 June 1989, p. A15.224 Peretz, Intifada, p. 172; "Baker Offers Blunt Words . . . , "  p. 1271.225 "Nearly there, if only . . . , "  p. 53.226 Peretz, Intifada, p. 173.221 Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1490, 27 May 1989; no. 1494,
24 June 1989, as cited in Peretz, Intifada, p. 154.
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The Likud party's July convention, in conjunction with Shamir's statement, 
resulted in a stalemate for all concerned. Egyptian President Mubarak attempted to 
reignite the process with a proposal for conducting elections in the territories, and 
entailed the following ten points:228
(1) Israel commits to accept the results of the election;
(2) International observers oversee the election;
(3) Israel grants immunity to elected officials;
(4) The IDF withdraws from the balloting area;
(5) Israel commits to start talks for a final status of the occupied territories by a 
certain date (within 3 to 5 years);
(6) Israel ends settlement activity;
(7) Israel allows free election campaigning;
(8) Israelis do not enter the occupied territories on election day;
(9) East Jerusalem Arabs participate in the election;
(10) Israel offers a commitment to exchange land for peace.
Reaction to this revived initiative was again mixed among Palestinians and 
Israelis.229 Some Palestinians stated that the ten points were a positive starting point 
for negotiations; others said the plan failed because it did not include a Palestinian 
state.230 The Israeli Labor party accepted the commitment for final status of the 
territories; participation among East Jerusalem Arabs; a halt to settlement activity; 
and an exchange of land for peace.231 Conversely, Likud rejected all ten points.232 
On 6 October 1989, the inner cabinet split with six votes each, and therefore 
rejected Mubarak's invitation to meet with Palestinians and discuss the initiative.233
Baker, in a hope of reinvigourating the process, then decided to take the 
reigns and offered five points to clarify Mubarak's ten points regarding the Shamir 
Plan. These five points entailed:234
228 Clyde Mark, Middle East Peace Proposals, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 20 March 1990), p. 14.229 See Drew Harrison, "All at Odds," The Middle East, no. 181, November 1989, pp. 11-13.2 Mark, Middle East Peace Proposals, p. 14.
231 Note Labor's acceptance of these points directly conflicts with earlier restrictions by Likud. Ibid.232 Ibid.233 Harrison, "All at Odds," p. 12.
234 Mark, Middle East Peace Proposals, p. 14; "Five Points Proposed by Baker," Washington Post, 7 December 1989, p. A43.
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(1) Israel meeting a Palestinian delegation in Cairo;
(2) Egypt consulting with, but not acting for, the Palestinians, and Egypt consulting 
with the United States and Israel;
(3) Israel actively engaging in a dialogue with the Palestinians after the Palestinian 
delegation has been worked out;
(4) Israel and the Palestinians discussing the election and future negotiations;
(5) The Egyptian, Israeli, and American foreign ministers meeting in Washington 
to facilitate the process.
The Palestinians, after being initially lukewarm over the amendments, 
seemed to resolve some of their internal differences, and verbalized a positive 
response. In February 1990, Arafat gave the Palestinians permission to enter peace 
negotiations with Israel. It was the first time Arafat had ever sanctioned such a 
dialogue. The 'breakthrough' was short-lived, though, as the Baker option 
succumbed to trenchant dissension and fracture within the Israeli National Unity 
Government.235 Labor supported the plan, but Likud refused to participate in any 
negotiations "with the PLO or with 'PLO men' who were part of a Palestinian 
delegation."236 Shamir further demanded that in the event of any hypothetical 
negotiations with an un-named, but unaffiliated Palestinian delegation, the U.S. 
should provide additional assurances to Israel - including unequivocal support for 
Israel in any disagreement.237 With Labor and Likud no longer able to resolve their 
differences, the careful edifice of ambiguities collapsed, as did the NUG when the 
executive of the Labor party resigned en masse.
Throughout the Administration's diplomatic tango with the PLO and Israel 
in attempting to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Congress was indomitable in 
its conviction that the Administration was undermining the future viability of Israel, 
and it immediately set in place a broad series of damage-control measures designed
235 David Ottaway, "Baker Plan for Middle East Dialogue Near Impasse," Washington Post, 29 November 1989, p. A12; Joel Brinkley, "Arafat, Yielding, Now Backs Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue," New York Times, 24 February 1990, p. A4.236 Mark, Middle East Peace Proposals, p. 15.
237 Ibid.', "Yes, Mr. Baker, b u t. . . , "  The Economist, vol. 313, no. 7628, 11 November1989, p. 53.
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to cushion its 'special relationship' with Israel. In June, for example, members of 
Congress became 'concerned' when Israeli Ambassador Arad criticized U.S. 
Ambassador Pelletreau for holding secret meetings with the PLO's second highest 
official, Salah Khalaf. Khalaf had been portrayed in the Defense Department's 
"Terrorist Group Profiles" handbook,238 and the Israeli government was upset 
because Khalaf had "played a primary role in setting and pronouncing the 
ideological course of the PLO and its terrorist activities throughout the years."239 
Senator Connie Mack wrote to Baker calling for the suspension of further contacts 
with the PLO. Three House members subsequently held a news conference 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the expanding U.S.-PLO relationship. 
Representative Mel Levine said the Pelletreau-Khalaf dialogue was an example of 
"the PLO tail wagging the U.S. dog. Congress should play a much more vigilant role 
and expand its oversight activities of Administration Middle East policy."240
The Administration was soon faced with a Helms amendment - drafted by 
AIPAC241 - which said that the U.S. may not negotiate with any PLO representative 
unless the President certifies to Congress that the Palestinian in question did not 
take part or conspire in terrorist activity that resulted in "the death, injury or 
kidnapping of an American citizen."242 Debate in the Senate also reflected its 
distrust of the Bush Administration and the State Department.243 Resenting such 
constraints on his power to direct foreign policy, Bush sent a letter to the Senate
238 James Dorsey, "Talks with PLO not bearing fruit, U.S. official says," Washington 
Times, 13 July 1989, p. A7.
239 David Ottaway, "Israel Criticizes U.S. Over New PLO Contacts," Washington Post, 30 June 1989, p. A26.240 Ibid.241 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Bush's Mideast Squeeze," Washington Post, 19 July 1989, p. A23.242 Robert Pear, "Congress is Urged to Reject Limits on U.S.-PLO Links," New York Times, 19 July 1989, p. Al.243 Robert Pear, "Senators Back Cut in Contacts With the PLO," New York Times,21 July 1989, p. Al.
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claiming that the Helms amendment "would interfere significantly with, if not
destroy, the ability of the U.S. to promote a viable peace process in the Middle
East."244 The Helms amendment was defeated by a vote of 75-23; but a compromise
version was passed 97-1. It stated:
[No Federal funds may be] made available for the conduct of the current dialogue on 
the Middle East peace process with any representative of the [PLO] if the President 
knows and advises the Congress that the representative directly participated in the 
planning or execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in the death or 
kidnapping of an American citizen.245
Ironically, the single dissenting vote came from Helms, who said the restrictions in 
the compromise version were not "tough enough."246
Congress continued its criticism of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, and what they 
perceived to be the Administration's naivete in believing that the 'historical realities' 
of the PLO could ever manifest itself in something other than 'terrorism.' During a 
Congressional hearing on Middle East developments in September 1989, 
Representative Smith reflected such sentiments to Ambassador Kelly, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs:
We have now been in discussions, both formal and informal, for the last ten 
months with the PLO. Some of us, Mr. Kelly, are getting very tired of plowing old 
ground, but unfortunately we have no choice because old ground is the only ground 
where we can, in fact, establish our point. There is no new ground. Nothing has 
changed [emphasis added].
When are we going to reject the PLO's consistent involvement in terrorism  and 
draw a line in the sand? We have an agreement with the PLO. They have breached 
that agreement innumerable times and have made public statements from Mr. A ra­
fat's mouth and from the mouth of the recognized spokesman for the PLO that are all 
in violation of the basic tenets of the agreement from which we entered into the 
negotiations or discussions.
When is the United States going to stop, turn around, and say 'either get off this 
and stop it, or we will stop negotiating?’ How many more terrorist attacks must 
people suffer from constituent groups of the PLO? How many more claims that 
Israel and its establishment is a crime? How many more remarks by other PLO 
recognized officials in connection with and in concert with Arafat, who claim that they 
will, in a two-step process, first move into Israel and destroy it?
244 Ibid.245 Ibid.246 Ibid.
56
How many more, Mr. Kelly, before we decide that we are dealing with people who 
have never changed? How many quotes must we have? How many terrorist attacks 
must there be? How many times must they reject the basic agreements that we made 
publicly by engaging in terrorist activity?
We want an answer. I want an answer. Is there some point at which we will say,
'Stop, we’ve had enough,' or are we just going to go blithely on forever?
I am serious about this.247
At the same hearing, questions were raised regarding the possibility that 
Arafat might apply for a visa to visit the United Nations. Representative Lantos 
commented:
There have been a lot of intransigent remarks, with the PLO lightly calling the 
establishment of Israel a mistake and calling for continued armed struggle. A re we 
going to reward this attitude of inflammatory statements with the issuance of a 
visa? 48
One week later, sixty-eight senators wrote to Baker, and argued that granting 
Arafat a visa would "undercut the peace process. . .  be antithetical to American 
interests and threaten the security of Israel."249 Even more notable than the letter 
itself, though, is the fact that more senators signed this letter than a similar one in
1988, in which the U.S. did refuse to let Arafat in the country, and resulted in the 
U.N. General Assembly being moved to Geneva to listen to Arafat's recognition of 
Israel and renunciation of terrorism (which eventually led to the U.S.-PLO 
dialogue).250 In the end, the senators' letter was written in vain, for Arafat never 
made the request.251
247 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Developments in the Middle East, September 1989,
19 September 1989, 101st Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1990).248 U.S. Congress, Developments in the Middle East, p. 15.
249 "Arafat-san," The Economist, vol. 313, no. 7623, 7 October 1989, p. 47.250 An advisor to Senator Mack, one of the letter's initiators, commented: "Instead of a serious transformation of the PLO, there has been a backtracking.. . .  The message is that we don't trust Arafat and we trust him even less than before." Ibid., p. 47.551 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "From Arafat to Bush," Washington Post,22 November 1989, p. A23.
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dialogue could continue with its enactment of the PLO Commitments Compliance
Act, which requires the State Department to report every 120 days on PLO
compliance with Arafat's commitment renouncing terrorism. On 20 March 1990,
the State Department submitted its report to Congress as mandated by the
legislation. The report concluded:
It is the Administration's position that the PLO has adhered to its commitment 
undertaken in 1988 to renounce terrorism. One problem area has been some actions 
undertaken by Damascus-based PLO groups such as the PFLP [Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine] and DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine]. We have no evidence that these actions were authorized or approved by 
the PLO Executive Committee or Arafat personally.252
Following the report's release, Senators Mack and Lieberman, both of whom 
cosponsored the legislation leading to the review, criticized the findings as reading
"more like a defense of the PLO than a balanced account of the PLO's record___"253
Instead of reading what he had hoped to be a more stringent account of PLO 
activities, Mack labelled it "close to a whitewash."254 Both Senators then circulated a 
"Dear Colleague" letter - with the report and a cynical editorial attached255 - urging 
their fellow legislators to "review the State Department report and judge for yourself 
if it effectively holds the PLO accountable for its actions and statements of the past
Congress sought to further confine the boundaries in which the U.S.-PLO
252 U.S. Department of State, PLO Commitments Compliance Act, Report prepared for the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 1990, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
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Other "Dear Colleague" letters have echoed similar sentiments, including one
by Representative Douglas, dated 26 February 1990, who wrote:
The enclosed card speaks louder than words as to the true aim of the PLO and its 
constituent groups. Please see that the emblems of all the various Palestinian [sic] 
Liberation Organizations include not just Samaria and Judaea (the West Bank) but 
the entire state of Israel. This should be kept in mind in weighing the security needs 
of our ally Israel. None of these organizations claim anything less than the
eradication of the state of Israel and their own emblems and seals back up that• *257 point.
Attached was the following card:258
WHATEVER THE NAME 
THE AIM IS THE SAME
257 Chuck Douglas, "Dear Colleague" letter regarding emblems of the PLO and its constituent groups, 26 February 1990.
258 Ibid.
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With sentiments such as those illustrated above, the intifadah has been 
overshadowed by seemingly impermeable perceptions of 'history' held by 
Congressional members; and if their memory happened to lapse even briefly, the 
lobby stepped in to remind them of the past. Thus for many in Congress, as 
Representative Smith reiterated in September 1989, "nothing has changed": The 
PLO still - and will always - sanction 'violence' and 'terrorism'; while Israel is still "a 
strong, vibrant democracy . . .  surrounded by hostile neighbours . . .  with the United 
States as its only friend and ally in an otherwise hostile world."259
Notwithstanding Congress' entrenched conviction and belief in such 
'historical verities,' 'History' has always cast strong counter-examples to such notions. 
Consider for instance the decades of U.S. intransigent belief in the unchanging 
nature of the 'Soviet Empire,' in light of the dramatic internal change which swept 
Eastern Europe. This seems to make a mockery of the belief in the notion of a fixed 
and unchanging 'human nature' that is essentially 'evil.' How quickly the old gods 
can disappear and new ones take their place, and look how such revelations ripple 
and reverberate throughout the whole cosmology of such a world-view. Take, for 
example, Senate Minority Leader Dole - anxious to assist the 'emerging 
democracies' of Eastern Europe - articulating an 'unthinkable,' let alone 
'unmentionable' proposal - cutting aid to Israel, the "sacred cow" in Congress.260 In a 
16 January 1990 editorial in the New York Times, Dole suggested a reassessment of 
the entrenched foreign aid process, in which Congress currently earmarks more than 
80% of its economic and military aid programs.261 He further noted that earmarking
259 Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, "Israel still living in an unfriendly neighbourhood," 
Washington Times, 25 January 1990.
260 Lois Romano, "The Senators and the Sacred Cows," Washington Post, 6 February 1990, p. C l; John Felton, "Dole Takes on Israeli Lobby, Proposes Cutting U.S. Aid," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 48, no. 3, 20 January 1990, p. 196.261 Bob Dole, "To Help New Democracies, Cut Aid to Israel, 4 Others," New York Times, 16 January 1990, p. A27. Also see John Felton, "Byrd Adds His Weight to Call For Closer Look at Funding," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 48, 
no. 6, 10 February 1990, pp. 408-409.
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for 'the big five' alone - Israel, Egypt, the Philippines, Turkey and Pakistan - 
accounts for two-thirds of the foreign aid budget. Dole thus proposed a 5% cut in 
aid programs for the big five - "enough to respond to the needs of new democracies 
such as Poland, Hungary, Panama and countless needy countries that under current 
allocations will receive not one penny of American aid."262 Dole, anticipating the 
response he would be receiving from his colleagues and constituency regarding the 
specific cut of $150 million to Israel, exclaimed that:
No doubt, these proposed reallocations will raise a hue and cry. But can't we 
convince our friends who would 'lose' a tiny amount of their aid how much it is in their 
interest, too, to help insure against the failure of new democracies and free-market 
economies?
Can't those pressure groups that have turned some of our foreign aid programs 
virtually into 'entitlement programs’ realize that making some minor adjustments in 
aid allocations can simultaneously serve the countries of their special interest and 
serve America?
And can't my colleagues in Congress, who have forced the President to swallow a 
few huge earmarked aid programs, stand up to domestic political pressure and resist 
the temptation to politicize foreign aid? Can't they instead support an amended 
foreign aid strategy that more completely serves the national interest?
To me, it boils down to this. Are big gains for freedom worth a small cut in a few 
huge foreign aid programs? I say yes.26
Needless to say, Dole's proposal did create an unmitigated clamour from 
Congress and the American Jewish community. Dole's 5% cut of 'the big five' was 
perceived solely as an attack against Israel and its lobby. An AIPAC official 
alleged, "Of course he's going after us."264 Members of Congress, with a few 
exceptions, publicly denounced Dole's idea: Senator Boschwitz wrote to the New 
York Times;265 Representative Ros-Lehtinen submitted an editorial to the 
Washington Times'266 Representative Hunter commended and circulated Ros- 
Lehtinen's piece in a "Dear Colleague" letter; and seventy-three senators wrote to 
Bush, opposing any cut in earmarked aid on the grounds that it would "send the
262 Dole, "Cut Aid to Israel," p. A27.263 Ibid.264 Felton, "Dole Takes on Israeli Lobby," p. 198.
265 Rudy Boschwitz, "Don't Cut Israel and Others to Aid East Europe," New York Times, 29 January 1990, p. A22.266 Ros-Lehtinen, "Israel still living . . .  unfriendly neighbourhood."
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wrong signals to the most extreme and violent factions in the region."267 Granted,
many members of Congress did privately applaud Dole for his gumption - but they
were quick to add that he could not count on their vote(s); the clout wielded by the
lobby remains substantial, and "sometimes the only explanation [for supporting
Israel] is that for politicians the cost of opposing Israel is still greater than the cost
of not supporting it."268 Even Dole acknowledges the reality of this conundrum:
Whenever Israel is involved, you almost sink the boat. I mean you rock it with any 
other country, but their lobby is so powerful. . . . Immediately it's perceived as going 
after Israel. . . . It's not giving the president more flexibility, or trying to find money 
for the emerging democracies. It's: Someone is picking on our friend Israel.269
While Congress and the lobby were hastily attempting to sweep Dole's 
proposal into the 'aberrations in history' closet, tempers again flared when the 
perceived 'Israel bashing' recommenced over the newly sensitized issue of Soviet 
Jewry, and settlements in the occupied territories. In 1989, more than 12,000 Soviet 
Jews immigrated to Israel; in the first five months of 1990 alone, under the new 
measures constituted in glasnost, about 41,500 immigrated. Sources estimate that by 
the end of 1990, more than 150,000 will arrive.270
Israel is elated with the ever-growing influx of 'compatriots,' for it reaffirms 
its belief in the primacy of its sacred 'homeland' - Eretz Israel.271 For Shamir and his
267 Helen Dewar, "Voices Rise as Foreign Aid Does Not," Washington Post,18 February 1990, p. A50.268 Carl Bernstein, "The Agony Over Israel," Time, vol. 135, no. 19, 7 May 1990.269 Romano, "The Senators and the Sacred Cows," p. Cl.270 Smolowe, "Come One, Come All," p. 58. Also see Joel Brinkley, "Israel to Censor News on Emigres," New York Times, 3 March 1990, p. A l.271 Indeed, Israel was witnessing a general decline (or yerida - literally 'descent') in population until this new wave of immigration. Sobel notes the symbolic importance of this immigration/emigration phenomenon: "Immigration and 
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Likud party, though, Soviet immigration plays yet another, perhaps more important, 
role - that of stemming the tide of the intifadah:
The Arabs around us are in a state of panic. . . . They are shrouded by a feeling of 
defeat, because they can see that the intifadah doesn't help. They cannot stop the 
natural streaming of the Jewish people to their homeland.2
Shamir further politicized Soviet Jewish immigration when he seemed to link 
it with settlements in the occupied territories. He commented, "Big immigration 
requires Israel to be big as well," and Israel should hold on to the territories because 
"we need the space to house the people."273
To lure these new faces into the territories, a billboard in front of one 
construction area in the West Bank advertises, "garden views . . .  the highest 
building standards."274 More significant, however, is a series of incentives designed 
to entice people - most of whom have little money - to settle in smaller towns, 
particularly the territories. A West Bank Data Project study prepared in February 
1990, delineated such incentives, which included direct housing subsidies from $9750 
to $21,600 depending on family size; land grants of 5% of the assessed value; 
mortgages free of interest for 65% of the loan's value, with another 25% of the loan 
at greatly reduced rates; Government-paid hookup charges for water, sewage and 
other municipal services; the ability to build homes as large as is desired without 
losing Government-backed mortgages; and subsidized transportation costs for 
settlers' children who are bused to Israel.275
The financial burden of assisting so many immigrants has been daunting, and 
Israel again turned to the American Jewish community and the U.S. government for 
help. American Jews have been responding to the United Jewish Appeal's $1 billion
272 Jackson Diehl, "Palestinian Cause Buffeted by Upheavals in Soviet Union, Eastern Europe," Washington Post, 29 January 1990, p. A15.
273 Joel Brinkley, "Israel Still Unprepared For Tide of Soviet Jews," New York Times, 18 January 1990, p. A6.274 Joel Brinkley, "West Bank's 'Garden Views' and 'Special Loans' Are Luring Jewish Settlers," New York Times, 4 March 1990, p. A3.
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fund-raising effort, termed 'Operation Moses.'276 Joseph Gruss donated $20 million 
in late 1989 to be divided among 3,000 Soviet Jewish families who qualify for 
subsidized mortgages.277 Congress, too, quickly followed; Senators Kasten and 
Leahy introduced a bill in the Senate to provide $400 million in off-budget loan 
guarantees which would help finance as many as 30,000 housing units in Israel.278
As with other forms of foreign assistance Israel receives from the U.S., the 
Kasten-Leahy bill included a number of 'special benefits' unavailable to other 
countries. $400 million is the largest amount ever guaranteed under the Agency for 
International Development's (AID) housing program, and to approve such aid, 
Congress would need to lift restrictions which currently apply to the program.279 
These restrictions include a $100 million annual cap on guarantees issued under the 
program, and a $25 million limit on the amount of loans that can be guaranteed 
annually for any country. The Kasten-Leahy bill would also require that 
management fees, usually assessed on countries benefiting from the housing 
program, be waived by the Administration. This waiver would save Israel $4 million 
initially, and as much as $2 million annually thereafter. The loans would also be 
exempt from two standard requirements which govern the housing subsidy program: 
the first requires that "housing built with U.S. guarantees must be in conjunction 
with other development programs and must be specifically designed to demonstrate 
the feasibility and suitability of particular kinds of housing or financial 
arrangements"; the second requires that at least 90% of U.S. financed housing be 
targeted to families with incomes below the median level of the designated country. 
Neither of the aforementioned requirements would be envisioned for Israel's
276 "420 Million Sought in '90 to Aid Soviet Jews in Israel," New York Times,20 January 1990, p. A5.277 "U.S. Donor Provides Israeli Immigrant Fund," New York Times, 22 December
1989, p. A10.278 Felton, "Congress Gearing Up to Give," p. 539.
279 Ibid., p. 541.
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housing projects for Soviet Jews.280 Finally, AID's authority to review Israel's use of 
the housing funds would be curtailed under the bill, which would hinder any ability 
to determine whether the guarantees were used in the occupied territories.281
Both Israel's policies regarding the settling of Soviet Jews as well as the 
related Kasten-Leahy bill resulted in further conflict over the direction of U.S. 
policy. On 1 March 1990, Baker testified in a House Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations hearing that the Administration might support the proposal to grant 
Israel a $400 million loan, "if there were some assurance, if the government of Israel 
perhaps could provide some assurances that it would not be engaging in any new or 
additional settlement activity . . .  in the territories."282 Baker's statement "fell like a 
bomb," for it was the first time that Israel found itself with the prospect of receiving 
'closely monitored' (as opposed to explicitly 'tied') aid from its trusted ally.283 
AIPAC's executive director, Dine, chastised the Administration for its lack of 
sympathy and understanding, and proceeded to rally the American Jewish 
community behind the Kasten-Leahy bill:
The Administration escalated the issue. Money, it said, is 'fungible,' so we want an 
assurance that you won't put any of your own shekel resources into the territories 
either. Israel came back and said, in effect, 'Don't worry: we are not creating any 
incentives for Soviet Jews to settle in the territories. All our housing programs for 
them are elsewhere, and this covers not only your money, but ours too.' But the 
Administration answered, in effect, 'Even this is not sufficient. We would like, not 
only that you do not create any new programs, but also that you end the old ones as 
well.'
Now wait a minute! This goes beyond so-called 'fungibility.' This is holding 
housing for Soviet Jews hostage, so we can reopen an old debate about settlements.
This is telling a democratic society that it must limit the freedom of movement of its 
people in order to get U.S. assistance. . . . This linkage is totally unacceptable to a 
sovereign democratic nation and to friends of Israel.
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Brothers and sisters, remember that Israel's friends in this city reside on Capitol 
Hill. Members of Congress need to know how Israel's supporters feel.
Our friends need to know that you know and deeply care about the vital 
importance of resettling Soviet . . . Jews in 1990. Ask your senators and 
representatives to support and vote for . . . S.2119, loan guarantee legislation - 
allowing the Government of Israel to borrow $400 m illion.. . .
It gives us no pleasure to be critical, but it is our duty to speak truth to power 
when the lives and the vital interests of our people and the Jewish state are 
affected.284
Two days later, Bush disappointed the Jewish community and Congress by 
reaffirming Baker's testimony, and further infuriated an already indignant audience 
by remarking that, "The foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe 
there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem."285 In the 
past, the U.S. has always regarded East Jerusalem as an occupied territory, but most 
Administrations have always quietly accepted settlement-building there, while 
objecting to building activity in the West Bank and Gaza. When asked for their 
position on Jerusalem, Administration officials would usually respond that "it must 
be a united city, it must never be divided again and its final status should be 
determined through negotiations."286 As such, Bush's remark set off waves of 
anxiety, and elicited complaints from all sides, which perceived that his statement 
represented the gravest departure from standard 'Washington ambiguity' yet. Dine 
expounded:
[The] right of Jews to live anywhere in Jerusalem, the holiest site and spiritual capital 
of the Jewish people and the indivisible political capital of the Jewish state, has never 
before been questioned by any American President, certainly not publicly.
284 Dine, "The Administration," p. 52285 Felton, "Bush Team Finds Wiggle Room," p. 931.
286 "The last time Jerusalem's relationship to the other occupied territories was raised in a contentious manner was in 1980 when the Carter Administration voted in favour of a Security Council resolution condemning all Israeli settlement activity in 
the territories 'including V.' This created such a furor among Israelis and their 
supporters in the United States, in the midst of a hotly contested presidential primary race between Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy, that the Administration 
eventually disavowed the vote." Thomas Friedman, "Bush Questions Israeli Claims to East Jerusalem, Creating Uproar," New York Times, 9 March 1990, p. A8.287 Thomas Dine, "The Administration," p. 51.
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Likewise, Congress again reasserted its support for Israel. In a "Dear 
Colleague" letter, Representatives Burton, Gilman, and Engel wrote, "Recently, 
unfortunate doubts have been raised about Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem.
Such doubts are gleefully being exploited by Israel's enemies, and do not help the 
peace process at all."288 Congress took such sentiments one step further, though, by 
sponsoring resolutions supporting Jerusalem as the "indivisible capital of the State 
of Israel."289 Senate Concurrent Resolution 106, with 86 cosponsors, passed by 
unanimous consent on 22 March 1990 - only two days after it had been introduced; 
House Concurrent Resolution 290 passed on 24 April 1990 by a vote of 378 to 34.290
As discussed above, one of the primary reasons for questions being raised 
over new settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem was a reaction to the 
controversy over the mass Soviet Jewish exodus to Israel. Although glasnost created 
the possibility for vast numbers of Soviet Jews to leave the Soviet Union, a U.S. 
quota, enacted in October 1989, denied these Jews entry to their preferred 
destination - the U.S. - thus contributing to the rapid influx of these immigrants into 
Israel, a country which grants the automatic 'right of return' to 'its people.' 
Previously, Soviet Jews were automatically granted refugee status in the U.S. on the 
assumption that they had "a well-founded fear of persecution" in their homeland.291 
Of the 280,000 Jews who left the Soviet Union between 1968 and 1988, little more 
than half traversed to Israel.292 The 1989 quota limited the number of Soviet
288 Dan Burton, "Dear Colleague" letter regarding support for Jerusalem as Israel's united capital, 3 April 1990.
289 Charles Schumer, et al., "Dear Colleague" letter regarding Jerusalem as Israel's capital, 21 March 1990.290 John Felton, "Dole Dust-up Over Jerusalem Touches Sensitive Nerve," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 48, no. 16, 21 April 1990, pp. 1202-1203; 
Glenn Simpson, "Bob Dole Calls Sense of Senate Resolutions 'Dangerous Nonsense,"' Roll Call, 23 April 1990, p. 8; Tom Kenworthy, "House Supports 
Jerusalem as Israeli Capital," Washington Post, 25 April 1990, p. A30.291 Robert Pear, "Moscow Rejects U.S. Plea to Allow Flights to Israel," New York Times, 20 February 1990, p. Al.292 "Rush from Russia," The Economist, vol. 314, no. 7637, 13 January 1990, p. 47.
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citizens allowed refugee status in the U.S. to 50,000. Pear notes that "at least
100,000 [Soviet Jews] would seek admission to the U.S. if they felt they could
succeed."293 Consequently, the ceiling has compelled many Soviet Jews to begin
anew in Israel: "although only 16.9 percent of all the Jews who left the Soviet Union
in 1989 chose to live in Israel, the figure jumped to more than 90 percent in January
this year, largely as a result of the new American quota."294
The implications of such a policy enacted by the Bush Administration reflect
the murky waters of its 'even-handed' approach to 'peace' between the Palestinians
and Israel. The U.S. quota directly contributed both to Shamir's euphoria in
fulfilling his hope for a "big Israel," as well as to the United States' frustration over
Shamir's continued approval of settlements in the occupied territories.
Something is wrong here: the United States helps Israel to take in Soviet emigrants 
and thereby to fulfil its founding purpose of providing a home for Jews in need. Israel 
uses the influx to strengthen the Israeli position in the West Bank - a result that runs 
directly counter to the lagging efforts of American diplomacy to move the Middle 
East toward peace.295
In February 1990, the Bush Administration abstained during a vote on a U.N. 
Human Rights Commission resolution which called on Israel not to settle Soviet
293 Pear, "Moscow Rejects U.S. Plea," p. A8294 Paul Lewis, "Arabs to Assail Israel on Soviet Jews," New York Times, 8 February1990, p. A3. Brinkley also cites that a mere 544 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel - as opposed to 4000 to the U.S. - in April 1989. Joel Brinkley, "Israel Reports an April Influx of 10,000 Jews From USSR," New York Times, 2 May 1990, p. A l.295 '"Big Immigration . . .  Big Israel,"' Washington Post, 1 February 1990, p. A20. Said reproaches the U.S. as well: "And the U.S., instituting severe quota restrictions, collaborated with Israel to make Israel the obligatory destination of Soviet Jew s.. . .  
[There] is a disquieting recrudescence of anti-Semitism to be concerned about,. . .  [and] Soviet Jews are experiencing difficulties. But are those difficulties worse than those that Palestinians suffer in the occupied territories because of Israeli brutality? Of course not. So why must Palestinians born in Palestine, who have homes and families in Nablus in Jerusalem, accept the idea that they cannot return, cannot enjoy a sovereign national life in the place of their birth and continuous habitation 
while Soviet Jews can displace more Palestinians in the process? Why must three million Palestinian refugees quietly accept that their right of return to a Palestinian 
state be postponed so that Soviet Jews can enjoy their right of return? But the brunt of the moral opprobrium attaches to the U.S. It must reopen its doors to Soviet Jews, most of whom wish to come here." Edward Said, "Again, Palestinians Suffer," New York Times, 6 March 1990, p. A23.
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immigrants in the territories.296 Three months later, the U.S. decided not to support 
the text of a U.N. Security Council resolution criticizing Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories because the language was too strong.297 On 26 May 1990, the 
U.S. blocked an attempt by the U.N. Security Council to send a mission to 
investigate the treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.298 
Despite what seem to be firm intentions by the Administration to engender a truly 
even-handed approach in its Palestinian-Israeli affairs, the new U.S. quota system 
for Soviet Jewry, combined with its voting trend in the U.N., allude to a directionless 
foreign policy which is governed more by a bullish Congress and historical precedent 
than any commitment to an equitable settlement.
Furthermore, the structural bias that has been etched into the international 
system at the height of U.S. 'hegemony' has not been adjusted to nurture the 
possibility of a resolution that the intifadah has created. While consistently rejecting 
international efforts to either examine or curtail Israeli activities in the occupied 
territories, the Administration has continued to attempt to circumscribe the 
boundaries which define PLO involvement in international affairs. In May 1989, the 
U.S. threatened to withdraw its membership and $75 million contribution to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) if the agency granted membership to the PLO; 
convinced by the threat, WHO members deferred the PLO's application.299 
Similarly, in November 1989, the U.S. warned that it would withhold its 25% share 
in funding the U.N. headquarters if the General Assembly agreed to upgrade the 
PLO's "non-state observer" status to that of an observer state, like Switzerland or the
296 Caryle Murphy and Jackson Diehl, "Hussein Warns U.S. On Israeli Settlements," Washington Post, 18 February 1990, p. A23.297 Robert Pear, "U.S. and Arabs End Settlement Talks," New York Times, 18 May1990, p. A5.298 Edward Cody, "U.N. Compromise Fails on Israel's Occupied Lands," Washington Post, 27 May 1990, p. A29; Paul Lewis, "U.S. Bars U.N. on Sending Mission to West Bank," New York Times, 27 May 1990, p. A6.299 In May 1990, the WHO deferred indefinitely the PLO's second attempt to join the agency. "U.N. Agency Rejects PLO Role," New York Times, 11 May 1990, p. A8.
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Vatican.300 The resolution was subsequently withdrawn.301 The U.N. Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), however, decided not to comply with a U.S. threat 
to cut its financial contribution if the FAO endorsed the PLO's role in providing 
technical assistance to Palestinian farmers in the occupied territories. On 9 January
1990, the U.S. announced that it would pay only $18 million of its $61.4 million bill 
(the U.S. was already $82 million in arrears) - just enough to allow the U.S. to 
maintain its vote in the FAO's governing council.302 The Bush Administration 
claimed that allowing the PLO to become involved in relief work "was an attempt to 
lend international legitimacy to the PLO's assertion that it represents a Palestinian 
state."303
Thus, in examining the day-to-day policy of the United States with respect to 
the intifadah, the crests and troughs of interest and resolve in finding a 'solution' to 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict become all-too-familiar. Dialogue after dialogue, 
plan after plan, resolution after resolution have yielded little in 'substantive 
progress,' because each leg of the fateful triangle envisions the notion of 'progress' 
from a different historical context. In all such dealings, a veneer of habit creates the 
illusion of 'something-being-done,' and hides the primacy of the United States' 
historical and emotional commitment to Israel. It must be realized, then, that 
beneath the labyrinth of rhetoric that prevails lies a foundation upon which the 
Administration and Congress remain committed to Israel above and beyond some 
form of 'Palestinian-Israeli peace.'
300 "U.N. Delays Vote on Shift in PLO Status," Washington Post, 5 December 1989, p. A44.
501 Paul Lewis, "U.N. Puts Off Its Vote on PLO," New York Times, 7 December 1989, 
p. A8.0^2 Jennifer Parmelee, "U.N. Agency Endorses Farm Aid Role for PLO," Washington Post, 30 November 1989, p. A38; Paul Lewis, "U.S. Cuts Funds to U.N. Food Agency over PLO," New York Times, 10 January 1990, p. A5.
303 Lewis, "U.S. Cuts Funds," p. A5.
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AN ENDURING LABYRINTH OF RHETORIC
Is the intifadah, then, an exercise in futility for the Palestinians? With 
respect to the Palestinians' own identity, the intifadah has undoubtedly succeeded, 
for it has demonstrated both to themselves and to the international community that 
the Palestinians are a people who possess a more defined national identity. Because 
the uprising has made it "less practicable than before to go over, under, or around 
the Palestinians," it has put the 'Palestinian issue' back on the agenda. The intifadah 
has become an enduring symbol of 'Palestinianization' - a process which is unlikely 
to fade with the passing of the day.304
At the same time, however, the intifadah has achieved little with respect to 
the political quandary vis-a-vis Israel. Following the collapse of the National Unity 
Government, three months of back-room wrangling resulted in the establishment of 
the first government consisting solely of right-wing and religious parties.305 With 
Shamir at the helm, not one member of the new government has advocated pursuing 
the Baker plan for initiating Palestinian-Israeli talks.306 In fact, the three small 
parties who joined the Shamir government - Tehiya, Tsomet, and Molodet - 
advocate annexation of the territories and the forced expulsion of the Palestinians 
who reside there. The Molodet party was formed in response to the intifadah during
1988, and argues that "'transfer' [is] a humane and practical solution that [will] 
obviate Israel's need to deal with millions of Arabs within its borders."307 Tsomet,
304 Rashid Khalidi, "The Uprising and the Palestine Question," p. 511.305 For a brief discussion of the resurgence of religious parties, see Gary Schiff, "Israeli Politics: The Renewed Centrality of Religion," in Reich and Kieval, Israel Faces the Future, pp. 41-52; Stewart Reiser, "The Religious Parties and Israel's Foreign Policy," in Reich and Kieval, Israeli National Security Policy, pp. 105-122.
306 Joel Brinkley, "Shamir Announces a New Government of the Right Wing,"New York Times, 9 June 1990, p. Al.307 Peretz, Intifada, pp. 36-37.
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too, was a recent addition to Israel's growing list of small parties, and was addressed 
by Shamir at its first national convention in 1988, who stated that Tsomet "would 
relay the message that the people of Israel had returned to their former land and 
would not trade one inch of it away."308 Similarly, a Tsomet supporter spoke of its 
party leader:
He's the only one who can raise us up from being a bent and bowed flock, and teach 
us how to kill, and killing's the only way we'll ensure we stay here. Everyone's done 
it - the Americans killed the Indians; the Germans killed until they united their 
country, the British killed in the Falklands, and they weren’t ashamed, they were 
proud to do it. It's the only way, and Raful is the only one.309
Furthermore, Ariel Sharon, who resigned from the NUG cabinet in February after
berating Shamir as being "weak and conciliatory," was appointed the Housing
Minister of the new Shamir government.310 Sharon has been noted as being an
outspoken proponent of increased Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, as
well as of the transfer of Palestinians out of the West Bank and Gaza.311 The
combination of such 'far right' factions with a comparatively 'moderate' Shamir
make any notion of a resolution with the Palestinians a distant mirage.
308 Ibid., p. 137.309 Jerusalem Post International Edition, no. 1434, 7 May 1988, as cited in Peretz, Intifada, p. 137. Similar statements have been made by members of the Tehiya party as well:" . . .  Israeli citizenship must not be granted to the Arabs in the territories, except for those 'who are willing to identify with the Zionist State of 
Israel, to be examined in Hebrew and Zionism, to do national service, and to pay taxes'; thus 'some of the Arab population (350,000-400,000 in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza) who hold refugee documents . . .  will have to find themselves a permanent hom e.. . .  This home will not be here, and just as we absorbed Jews from the Arab countries, the Arab countries will have to absorb the refugees.' As cited in 
Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Decisions, trans. Lenn Schramm, (London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1988), p. 118. For a further discussion of Tehiya, see Aaron Rosenbaum, "Tehiya as a Permanent Nationalist Phenomenon," in Reich and Kieval, Israeli National Security Policy, pp. 147-168.310 Brinkley, "Shamir Announces a New Government," p. A2. Upon resigning in February, Sharon stated: "He [Shamir] is a dangerous man who can never be forgiven for anesthetizing the people. That means we come to negotiations from a position of weakness, and that's a disaster." Joel Brinkley, "Sharon's Backers Urge 
Him to Stay," New York Times, 18 February 1990, p. A9.
311 Evans and Novak, "Bush's Mideast Squeeze," p. A23.
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Nonetheless, regardless of whether Likud, Labor or any coalition thereof was 
successful in forming the new Israeli government, the likelihood of securing a 
settlement acceptable to all concerned would have remained negligible. Existential 
concerns borne of a traumatic communal history still reign strong among the current 
generation of Israeli leaders, whatever their political leanings may be. Goodman 
contends:
How ironic, indeed tragic, that at this moment of genuine opportunity for talks with 
the Palestinians, history finds Israel at the zenith of strategic strength and at its nadir 
in leadership. The current generation of Israeli leaders has been too scarred by doubt 
and pain to believe in itself. It has no self-confidence, and consequently it will not be 
the generation to deliver peace. Its political agenda has been tem pered more by the 
ideologies of the diaspora than current Israeli political realities. M emories of 
Palestinian terrorist barbarism continue to be more powerful than the belief, however 
opaque, that change is indeed possible.312
Former Israeli Intelligence Chief, Yehoshafat Harkabi, maintains that if 
Israel turns a blind eye to the PLO's efforts, whether from fear or otherwise, a 
catastrophe will result for both peoples:313
Israel does not face choices between good alternatives in dealing with the Palestinian
issue. All alternatives entail some risk and some pain. But there are 'less bad'
outcomes, provided that Israelis are guided by the notion of a 'Zionism of quality,' not
of acreage. A smaller, more Jewish Israel, at peace with its neighbours, would be
more secure than a larger Israel with a sizable Palestinian minority with second-class 314status.
As with Israel, though, internal divisions have always existed within the 
Palestinian community regarding the direction of future relations between the 
Jewish community and the Palestinians. The "fundamental division revolves around 
those willing to accept the national identity and political existence of the other, and
312 Hirsh Goodman, "Israel: A Government Paralyzed," New York Times, 19 July1989, p. A23. Goodman continues: "Israel's leaders can't seem to realize that 
they finally won the war and brought Yasir Arafat to understand that while the thought of a Jewish state in Palestine remains anathema to him, it is a reality he cannot ignore. They cannot seem to accept that perhaps the PLO has changed its 
tune "313 Robert Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," p. 360.314 As cited in William Quandt, "U.S. Policy," p. 385. Also see Harkabi, Israels Fateful Decisions, for an in-depth explanation of his position.
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those who still refuse such recognition."315 Habash, leader of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a division of the PLO, has not hesitated when 
commenting on his position with respect to proposed Palestinian-Israeli talks, nor 
on his disposition toward Israel.316 He maintains that "the intifadah is not the end of 
the armed struggle, just one of its stages.. . .  We need to understand that Israel is an 
aggressive entity which threatens the entire Arab world."317 Islamic fundamentalist 
factions, such as Hamas, have proclaimed th a t"jihad [holy w ar]. . .  [is] the 'personal 
obligation' of every Muslim, for Palestine [is] the 'soil of the Islamic trust till the end 
of days' and the Jews [are] an instrument of evil that turns the wheels of history."318
The popularity of such groups, in conjunction with the lack of any substantive 
political gains in the intifadah - despite Arafat's concessions - have resulted in 
increased internecine violence among Palestinians. More than 175 have been killed 
as Palestinians have targeted those of "questionable moral conduct."319 
Furthermore, on 30 May 1990, members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a 
PLO faction, were thwarted in an attempted seaborne raid near a Tel Aviv beach.320 
Granted, the internecine and factional violence that has occurred does not represent 
the attitude of a majority within the Palestinian community; nevertheless, these
315 Peretz, Intifada, pp. 100-101.316 Ihsan Hijazi, "Habash Is Opposing Arafat's Policy on Talks," New York Times,9 March 1990, p. A9.317 al Dhaher, "George Habash," p. 15.
318 Schiff and Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, p. 237. Also see Robert Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising," Orbis: A Journal o f World Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 389-401.
319 "Among weekly reports of intra-Palestinian intifada casualties are prisoners strangled by fellow jail inmates and charred and mutilated bodies dumped in camps and villages. Cases of women beaten and raped as punishment for their supposedly errant husbands have also surfaced." "The price of no solution," The Middle East, no. 181, November 1989; Richard Chesnoff, Daoud Kuttab, and David Makovsky, "The internecine war of the West Bank," U.S. News and World Report, vol. 107, no. 8,21 August 1989; Steven Emerson, "The Intifada You Don't See on TV," Wall Street Journal, 21 February 1990, p. A14.320 Yousef Ibrahim, "Israel Reports Foiling Speedboat Attack on Beach," New York Times, 31 May 1990, p. Al.
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more violent actions - both against Palestinians and Israelis - will escalate as 
Palestinians witness their efforts toward moderation lead to nothing.321 Kuttab 
explains:
Every day that Palestinians or Israelis are hurt or killed, the cycle of violence 
increases. Many in the PLO are trying to restrain the hardline elements. But with 
each day of violence, support for nonviolent resistance will fade, and calls for more 
violence and the use of firearms will be received with greater enthusiasm. This would 
bring tragedy to both Palestinians and Israelis.
The U.S. maintains a central position with respect to 'controlling' the course 
of a 'settlement' between the Israelis and the Palestinians. As demonstrated in 
Section IV, the United States' efforts toward assisting with the Palestinian-Israeli 
peace process reflect a strong proclivity toward its 'democratic' ally, Israel. That the 
U.S. maintains this regime of practice is best exemplified by its position with respect 
to the establishment of a Palestinian state. During his address to AIPAC, Baker 
may have asked Israel to lay aside the 'unrealistic vision of a greater Israel,' yet in 
that same speech he also reaffirmed that "the U.S. does not support the creation of 
an independent Palestinian state."323 Acknowledging the existential realities and 
right to self-determination of the Palestinians does not correspond with 'statehood' 
in the eyes of the U.S., which is ever-cognizant of Israel's 'security dilemma.'324 By 
thus advocating such a 'non-negotiable' position to a people who see a Palestinian 
state as the solution leaves the fateful triangle with little, if any, room for discussion, 
and in the end does indeed dictate the structure and limits of the vista in which any 
'lasting peace' could ever be negotiated.325
321 Robert Friedman, "Israel's Fateful Hour," p. 358; Stein, "The spectrum of Palestinian opinion," p. 17; Abba Eban, "Keep Talking With the PLO," New York 
Times, 24 July 1989, p. A ll.
322 Daoud Kuttab, "Threats to the PLO Will Backfire," New York Times, 2 June 1990, p. A27.523 Baker, "Principles and Pragmatism," p. 2.324 Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. ix.325 See Salah Khalaf, "Lowering the Sword," Foreign Policy, no. 78, Spring 1990, pp. 92-112.
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The PLF's 30 May 1990 raid merely became the catalyst by which Arafat's 
astonishing concessions were finally abrogated. Pressure from Israel, the lobby, and 
Congress, combined with the Administration's perception that Arafat had not done 
enough to condemn the raid and take disciplinary action against the PLF's leader, 
Abul Abbas, 'convinced' the U.S. to suspend indefinitely the dialogue.326 Indeed, the 
U.S. commitment to Israel has remained unyielding. Its $3 billion (and rising) 
'financial key' to Israel's present and future 'existence' is ensured by its intractable 
domestic political process, which has been only superficially touched by the tragedy 
unfolding in the territories.327 The U.S. government is too entangled with the Jewish 
lobby, too enmeshed in its own historical context, and too blindly committed to 
maintaining its 'ally' - financially and emotionally - than to contributing to any 
'meaningful peace process.'328 In the end, though the intifadah has given meaning 
and identity to a new generation of Palestinians, one can only envision that the 
fateful triangle will maintain its precarious existence, and that a labyrinth of rhetoric 
will continue for some time to come.
326 Nora Boustany, "Four Senators Urge End to Dialogue with PLO," Washington Post, 7 June 1990, p. A30; John Goshko and Ann Devroy, "PLO Condemns Attacks on Civilians," Washington Post, 12 June 1990, p. A19; Thomas Friedman, "Bush Calls Off U.S.-PLO Talks, Citing Arab Raid," New York Times, 21 June 1990, p. Al.327 Rabie goes so far as to claim that American support for Israel has "transformed the Jewish state into a vulnerable client-state that has little chance of surviving on its 
own." Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 94.328 Khouri affirms: "No American initiative can succeed until American leaders first acquire an accurate and complete understanding about the basic roots of the overall 
. . .  problem; the real obstacles to resolving it; and the policies which must be firmly 
and courageously adopted to remove these obstacles and to promote that kind of peace settlement which reasonably takes into consideration the legitimate needs and interests of all the parties.. . .  Unless the United States can provide a knowledgeable, bold, and effective leadership which is so urgently and desperately needed, the Middle East will continue to face mounting tensions and instabilities and, ultimately, another war." Fred Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3d ed., (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 523.
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